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CALIFORNIA'S FORECLOSURE STATUTES: SOME
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
Cynthia A. Mertens*
I. INTRODUCTION
Spurred by the harsh economics of the Great Depression, Cali-
fornia enacted several statutes' designed to protect pledgors of real
property from unfair and often ruinous deficiency judgments.' This
legislation includes Code of Civil Procedure sections 580a,' the fair
value section, 580b," the purchase-money anti-deficiency statute,
© 1986 by Cynthia A. Mertens
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law; J.D., 1972, U.C. Hastings
College of Law; B.A., 1969, Stanford University. Admitted to the California Bar, 1972. The
author wishes to thank Michelle M. McKim, a graduate of Santa Clara University School of
Law, for her important contribution to the preparation of this article.
1. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 580a, 580b, 580d & 726 (West Supp. 1986). Hereaf-
ter, all references in the text are to the California Code of Civil Procedure except as noted.
2. A deficiency occurs when a purchaser of real property defaults on the note which is
secured by the property; the creditor then forecloses, but there is a "deficiency" since the sale
of the property does not produce enough to pay off the balance due on the note. The creditor
may sue the debtor to obtain a money judgment for that amount.
3. The fair value provisions of section 580a state that, after the property has been
nonjudicially foreclosed, the beneficiary can file a complaint asking for a deficiency. The court,
if requested to do so by either party, must appoint a probate tax referee to appraise the prop-
erty. The court then finds the fair market value of the property at the time of sale and renders
a judgment for "not more than the amount by which the entire amount of the indebtedness due
at the time of sale exceeded the fair market value." This action for a deficiency must be
brought within three months of the date of sale. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a (West Supp.
1986).
4. Section 580b states:
No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any sale of real property
for failure of the purchaser to complete his contract of sale, or under a deed of
trust, or mortgage, given to the vendor to secure payment of the balance of the
purchase price of real property, or under a deed of trust, or mortgage, on a
dwelling for not more than four families given to a lender to secure repayment
of a loan which was in fact used to pay all or part of the purchase price of such
dwelling occupied, entirely or in part, by the purchaser.
Where both a chattel mortgage and a deed of trust or mortgage have been
given to secure payment of the balance of the combined purchase price of both
real and personal property, no deficiency judgment shall lie at any time under
any one thereof if no deficiency judgment would lie under the deed of trust or
mortgage on real property.
Id. at § 580b.
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580d,' the nonjudicial foreclosure anti-deficiency statute, and 726,8
the "one-action" rule. Three decades of judicial interpretation, how-
ever, have created a body of case law 7 which fails to advance the
legislative purposes upon which the courts purportedly base their
decisions."
The time has come for California to substantially revise its De-
pression-era anti-deficiency legislation in order to express and effec-
tuate purposes consistent with the expectations of both debtor and
creditor in today's society. Current sections 580a, 580b and 726 have
generated much controversy in their application. The results ob-
tained in the everyday application of the statutes as interpreted by
the courts, are irreconcilable with the court-declared principles that
underlie this legislation. Therefore, the author proposes a revision of
sections 580a, 580b and 726 to bring those statutes in line with the
needs of real estate borrowers and creditors today.
A. The 580a Proposal
Section 580a, enacted in 1933, provides that a deficiency judg-
ment after a nonjudicial foreclosure sale shall be limited to the dif-
ference between the fair market value of the property at the time of
the sale and the outstanding principal balance9 on the secured obli-
gation. In 1939, however, section 580d was enacted barring all defi-
ciency judgments after a nonjudicial foreclosure, thereby rendering
section 580a obsolete." The author proposes an amendment of sec-
5. The pertinent paragraph of section 580d states:
No judgment shall be rendered for any deficiency upon a note secured by a deed
of trust or mortgage upon real property hereafter executed in any case in which
the real property has been sold by the mortgagee or trustee under power of sale
contained in such mortgage or deed of trust.
Id. at § 580d.
6. The pertinent part of section 726 states: "(a) There can be but one form of action for
the recovery of any debt or the enforcement of any right secured by mortgage upon real prop-
erty, which action must be in accordance with the provisions of this chapter." Id. at § 726.
7. The first decision of significance interpreting section 580b is Brown v. Jensen, 41
Cal. 2d 193, 259 P.2d 425 (1953). The next major decision, Roseleaf v. Chierighino, 59 Cal.
2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1963), was decided ten years later.
8. The legislative purposes, first articulated in Roseleaf, are discussed in depth in section
II part B, infra, of this article. See infra notes 57-58.
9. Section 580a permits interest to be added to the balance due. CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE
§ 580a (West Supp. 1986).
10. As stated by Professor John R. Hetland:
Code of Civil Procedure 580a, which affects only the nonjudicial sale, is largely,
if not entirely, obsolete as a result of the subsequent enactment of Section 580d
. combined with the judicial determination that section 580a is inapplicable
to the only large volume of secured transactions not affected by Section 580d,
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tion 580a which, while leaving section 580d intact, would breathe
new vitality into the dormant statute by applying its principle of fair
valuation to certain foreclosure situations in which the value should,
in equity, be considered by the courts. 1
B. The 580b Proposal
Section 580b currently prevents creditors from obtaining defi-
ciency judgments after foreclosure in two cases. The statute bars any
vendor of real property who has taken a note secured by that prop-
erty ("seller carry-back" transaction) from obtaining a deficiencyjudgment.' It also bars a third party lender from obtaining a defi-
ciency judgment if the loan is for the purchase of a one-to-four unit,
owner-occupied residential dwelling ("residential purchase-money"
loan).
As will be discussed in section II, the courts have applied the
statute to a number of situations not clearly contemplated, or pro-
vided for, by the Legislature. The result is a series of opinions that
give lip-service to the purported two-fold purpose"3 of the statute but
which reach results that, in the author's opinion, contravene both the
express provisions of the statute and the supposed intent of the
Legislature.
A growing trend in both case law 4 and in legislation' has been
to provide increasing protection for homeowners, while exercising a
hands-off policy in commercial transactions. The author's proposed
amendments would codify this trend by incorporating the protection
forwarded homeowners, while allowing deficiency judgments in com-
non-purchase-money, junior creditor ...J. HETLAND, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE SECURED TRANSACTIONS § 6.1, at 234 (1970). See
also R. BERNHARDT, CALIFORNIA MORTGAGE AND DEED OF TRUST PRACTICE § 4.18, at
153-54 (1979); Leipziger, Deficiency Judgments in California: The Supreme Court Tries
Again, 22 UCLA L. REV. 753, 753 n.1 (1975).
11. See infra section II part A.
12. Roseleaf interpreted § 580b in such a way that only vendors who carry back a note
secured by a deed of trust on the actual property purchased are barred from obtaining a defi-
ciency. See discussion of Roseleaf in section II part B, infra.
13. The two-fold purpose of section 580b, stated by the California Supreme Court, is(1) to prevent overvaluation of property given to secure the balance due on a purchase-money
note, and (2) to prevent aggravation of an economic depression which would occur if debtors
were burdened with personal judgments after losing their property through foreclosure.
Roseleaf, 59 Cal. 3d at 35, 378 P.2d at 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 873. See infra notes 56-58 and
accompanying text.
14. See Spangler v. Memel, 7 Cal. 3d 603, 498 P.2d 1055, 102 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1972);Prunty v. Bank of America, 37 Cal. App. 3d 430, 112 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1974).
15. See infra section III.
19861
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mercial transactions subject to the fair value provisions of the
amended section 580a.
C. The 726 Proposal
Section 726 provides at present that a creditor is entitled to "one
form of action" when it chooses to judicially foreclose a deed of
trust.1" This section has been interpreted to require a creditor to
foreclose on the property before requesting a deficiency judgment.' 7
If the creditor does not foreclose first, the debtor may raise section
726 as an affirmative defense, and the creditor will be required to
exhaust the security first before seeking a personal judgment against
the debtor.18 If the creditor ignores the security and obtains a per-
sonal judgment against the debtor (because the debtor failed to raise
the section 726 affirmative defense), the creditor will be prohibited
from later foreclosing on the security by section 726's "sanction"
effect. 9
The purpose of section 726 is to protect the debtor by requiring
that the security be exhausted before personal liability is imposed.20
The courts, however, in applying section 726, have sometimes lost
sight of the purpose of the statute and have rendered decisions which
are unfair to the creditors involved." The two aspects of section 726
- affirmative defense and sanction effect - must be clarified so that
the courts will apply the statute as the Legislature intended. 2
Section II of this article reviews the present statutes and case
law interpreting them in order to illustrate the problems with the
anti-deficiency statutes and the contexts in which they have arisen.
Section III highlights the current legislative policy to give special
protection to residential real estate purchasers. In section IV, the
proposed statutory revisions are set out and analyzed.
II. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CALIFORNIA'S ANTI-DEFICIENCY
LEGISLATION
Few real property purchasers can afford to pay cash for their
16. See infra note 26 for the "one form of action" language of section 726.
17. Felton v. West, 102 Cal. 266, 269, 36 P.2d 676, 679 (1894).
18. See Salter v. Ulrich, 22 Cal. 2d 263, 138 P.2d 7 (1943).
19. See Walker v. Community Bank, 10 Cal. 3d 729, 735-36, 518 P.2d 329, 333, 111
Cal. Rptr. 897, 901 (1974).
20. Id.
21. See Bank of America v. Daily, 152 Cal. App. 3d 767, 773, 199 Cal. Rptr. 557, 560
(1984).
22. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
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property, 2  and, even if they could afford to pay cash, many finance
their purchases because of favorable tax advantages.24 Generally, a
purchaser of real property borrows the balance of the purchase price
from either the seller or a third party lender. This loan is secured by
a deed of trust on the property, thus entitling the lender to foreclose
on the property should the buyer default on his or her payments. 25
The foreclosure may be either through the judicial process26  or
through a nonjudicial process."
If the creditor chooses to judicially foreclose a nonpurchase-
money deed of trust,2' it is entitled to a deficiency judgment if the
23. Analysis of residential sales listed in San Jose Real Estate Board's publication on
Quarterly Sales & Disposition Report (for members only) covering the first quarter of 1984
reveals that less than one percent of all purchasers pay cash for their property. Of the 507
residences sold, only two were paid for with cash.
24. Interest paid on loans is tax deductible. Property taxes are likewise deductible.
I.R.C. §§ 163, 164 (West Supp. 1986); CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 17201 (West Supp. 1986).
25. A typical deed of trust in California contains language similar to the following:
That upon default by Trustor in payment of any indebtedness secured
hereby or in performance of any agreement hereunder, Beneficiary may declare
all sums secured hereby immediately due and payable by delivery to Trustee of
written declaration of default and demand for sale and of written notice of de-
fault and of election to cause to be sold said property, which notice Trustee shall
cause to be filed for record. Beneficiary also shall deposit with Trustee this
Deed, said note and all documents evidencing expenditures secured hereby.
After the lapse of such time as may then be required by law following the
recordation of said notice of default, and notice of sale having been given as then
required by law, Trustee, without demand on Trustor, shall sell said property
at the time and place fixed by it in said notice of sale, either as a whole or in
separate parcels, and in such order as it may determine, at public auction to the
highest bidder for cash in lawful money of the United States, payable at time of
sale . ..
After deducting all costs, fees and expenses of Trustee and of this Trust,
including cost of evidence of title in connection with sale, Trustee shall apply
the proceeds of sale to payment of: all sums expended under the terms hereof,
not then repaid, with accrued interest of the amount allowed by law in effect at
the date hereof; all other sums then secured hereby; and the remainder, if any,
to the person or persons legally entitled thereto.
26. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 726(a) (West 1980 and Supp. 1985). Section 726(a) states
that "There can be but one form of action for the recovery of any debt for the enforcement of
any right secured by mortgage upon real property .. " Section 726(b) refers to the creditor's
right to obtain a deficiency unless such a deficiency is barred by section 580b. It also contains a
fair value provision similar to that of section 580a. See supra note 3. Section 726(e) provides
that, if a deficiency is waived, the property is sold pursuant to section 716.020. (Section
716.020 sets forth the procedure to use when levying on property to satisfy a judgment.) If a
deficiency is not waived or prohibited, the property is sold subject to the right of redemption in
sections 729.010-729.090.
27. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924 (West Supp. 1986) governs the nonjudicial foreclosure
situation.
28. CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 725(a) (West Supp. 1986) states:
The beneficiary or trustee named in a deed of trust or mortgagee named in a
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fair market value of the property does not equal or exceed the bal-
ance due on the note.29 Since the creditor has the right to a defi-
mortgage with power of sale upon real property or any interest therein to secure
a debt or other obligation, or if there be a successor or successors in interest of
such beneficiary, trustee or mortgagee, then such successor or successors in in-
terest, shall have the right to bring suit to foreclose the same in the manner and
subject to the provisions, rights and remedies relating to the foreclosure of a
mortgage upon such property.
d.
29. Id. at § 726. Section 726 limits deficiency judgments after judicial foreclosures.
It has been suggested that fair market value, as used in Civil Procedure Code sections
580a and 726 is not to be measured by the price a willing buyer would pay pursuant to a
normal sale. Rather it is the price which can be expected to be obtained under forced sale
circumstances. Leipziger, supra note 10, at 763 n.32.
A California court of appeal noted that fair market value varies with the circumstances
surrounding the foreclosure sale, and the court must consider the entire situation before mak-
ing such a determination. Nelson v. Orosco, 117 Cal. App. 3d 73, 172 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1981).
In Nelson, the court held that a low bid was acceptable because the land was "subject to the
expense and vicissitudes of a lawsuit which could result in the purchaser obtaining nothing at
all for the price he had paid." Id. at 79, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 460.
However, in the more recent case of Rainer Mortgage v. Silverwood Ltd., 163 Cal. App.
3d 359, 209 Cal. Rptr. 294 (1985), a California appellate court significantly limited the poten-
tial impact of the broad language in Nelson. In Rainer, the creditor judicially foreclosed on the
debtor's property after a default on a loan and subsequently sought a deficiency judgment. A
dispute arose in the appellate court regarding the meaning of "fair value" in the context of a
judicial foreclosure sale.
Rainer (the creditor), relying on Nelson, argued that because the borrower has the right
to redeem the property within one year after a foreclosure sale (CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§
729.010(a), 729.030(b)), the marketability of the property is restricted. Accordingly, he con-
tended that the deficiency judgment should represent the difference between the immediate
resale value of the property (presumably impaired by the redemption right of the borrower),
and the amount of the outstanding indebtedness. 163 Cal. App. 3d at 363, 209 Cal. Rptr. at
296.
The court rejected Rainer's argument and concluded that the borrower's redemption right
was not one of the factors to consider in determining "fair value" under the Nelson approach.
The Rainer court reasoned that the Nelson case was distinguishable because in that case, the
factor which affected merchantability was a lis pendens that was not a product of a foreclosure
sale. The Nelson court had concluded that external factors must be considered in computing
fair value but did not hold that internal factors, arising from the foreclosure sale itself, must be
considered. Accordingly, the Rainer court stated that the Nelson decision did not apply in the
Rainer factual setting. Id. at 365, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 296-97.
Finding Nelson inapplicable, the Rainer court proceeded to examine the language and
legislative history of the fair value provision in section 726. The court determined that the
purpose of the fair value provision was to protect the defaulting mortgagor. The court con-
cluded that the proper measure of fair value of the property is the intrinsic value of the prop-
erty at the time of sale. The court held that the rights of the creditor were not substantially
impaired by the fact that resale within one year is less likely due to the redemption right of the
borrower. The court reasoned that the lender was only "temporarily deprived of the property's
'fair value' and its market value as encumbered," because the right of redemption expires
within one year. Id. at 367, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 299.
Finally, the court noted that the "risk of loss" placed on Rainer is fair, because it is
partially a result of his own actions. Rainer could have elected to foreclose nonjudicially, and
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ciency, 0 the debtor is entitled to redeem the property"1 within a year
if the proceeds of the sale do not satisfy the debt, or within three
months if the proceeds equal or exceed the balance due. 32 If the cred-
itor waives the right to a deficiency,"8 the debtor has no right to
redeem. 84
Nonjudicial foreclosure is accomplished by exercising the power
of sale in a deed of trust or mortgage. Certain procedural steps must
be undertaken by the trustee prior to the sale,85 but there is no statu-
tory provision for a judicial determination of the validity of the al-
leged default." If the creditor forecloses nonjudicially, it has no right
to a deficiency judgment against the debtor should the sale bring less
than the amount due on the note."1 Since the creditor cannot obtain a
then the borrower would have no right to redemption. Id. at 369, 209 Cal. Rptr. at 299-300.
30. This assumes the note is not purchase-money as defined in California Civil Proce-
dure Code section 580b.
31. CAL.. CIV. PROC. CODE § 729.020 (West Supp. 1986). Section 729.020 limits the
right of redemption to the judgment debtor and his or her successor in interest.
Prior to July 1, 1983, the right of redemption extended to junior lienors as well as to
debtors and debtor's successors-in-interest. The recent curtailment of the right of redemption
was due in large part to the California Law Revision Commission's position on this matter.
The California Law Revision Commission has criticized the debtor's right of redemption
because the purposes (such as forcing the purchaser at the sale to bid an amount near the
property's fair value and giving the debtor another chance to save the property) have not been
met. The Commission's position is that the right of redemption operates "as the greatest im-
pediment to the achievement of the primary purpose of obtaining a fair bid at a sale of real
property because the purchaser can only obtain title that is defeasible for another year or, in
certain cases, three months." The Commission proposed legislation which would eliminate the
statutory right of redemption after judicial sale, with the exception of cases where a deficiency
judgment is sought upon foreclosure of a mortgage or deed of trust. 1981 Creditor's Remedies
Legislation, 16 CAL.. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 1001, 1119 (1982).
32. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 729.030 (West Supp. 1986).
33. Id. at § 726(e).
34. Id. at § 701.680.
35. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2924-2924h (West Supp. 1986).
36. This nonjudicial foreclosure proceeding has been unsuccessfully challenged as a dep-
rivation of property without adequate notice. Garfinkle v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 268, 578
P.2d 945, 146 Cal. Rptr. 208 (1978).
37. CAL. Civ. PROC. CODE § 580d (West 1976). See supra note 5 for text.
In First Fed. Say. and Loan Ass'n v. Lehman, 159 Cal. App. 3d 537, 205 Cal. Rptr. 600
(1984), a California appellate court held that section 580d barred an action for fraud against
the buyer because the lender had previously foreclosed on the property. The court ignored the
fact that an action for fraud is a tort action and that any such recovery would not be a defi-
ciency judgment.
Financial Code sections 779, 7459 and 7460, effective January 1, 1986, allow banks and
savings and loan associations to recover damages, including punitive damages, resulting from
intentional misrepresentations made by borrowers to obtain loans. The fact that the property
was sold nonjudicially and that therefore a deficiency judgment would be barred by section
580d is irrelevant. However, if the loan is under $150,000 and is secured by a single-family
owner-occupied residence, the financial code sections do not apply. CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 779,
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
deficiency judgment, the debtor is not entitled to redeem.8"
A. The Impotent Fair Value Provisions of Section 580a
When section 580a 89 was enacted in 1933, it was possible for a
creditor to sell the property nonjudicially and then to request a defi-
ciency judgment against the debtor through the courts. A deficiency
was available only when the fair market value was less than the
balance due on the obligation.40 On the other hand, if the debt was
eliminated as a result of the sale because the sale price was equal to
or exceeded the balance due, the debtor had no remedy.4" Thus, evi-
dence of the fair market value was only relevant in determining the
amount of the deficiency judgment.4 2
In 1939, section 580d" was enacted. This section bars all defi-
ciency judgments after nonjudicial sales. Sections 580a and 580d ap-
pear, on their face, to be inconsistent since one implies a right to a
deficiency after a nonjudicial sale, and the latter section expressly
bars such a deficiency. In fact, numerous commentators have ex-
pressed the belief that section 580a is obsolete.4
7459, 7460 (West Supp. 1986).
38. After a judicial foreclosure, the creditor has the right to a deficiency, and the debtor
has the right of statutory redemption. After a nonjudicial foreclosure, the creditor has no right
to a deficiency, and the debtor has no right to redeem. Thus, numerous cases have stated that
section 580d puts nonjudicial foreclosure on parity with judicial foreclosure. Roseleaf, 59 Cal.
2d at 43, 378 P.2d at 102, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 878; Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 15 Cal. 3d 590, 604,
542 P.2d 981, 991, 125 Cal. Rptr. 557, 567 (1975).
39. See supra note 3 for a summary of CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580a.
40. For example, if the property was sold for its fair market value of $8,000 but the
balance due on the note was $12,000, the creditor would have been entitled to a deficiency
judgment of $4,000. Had the property been sold for $7,000, the deficiency would remain
$4,000, assuming $8,000 was the fair market value. See supra note 3.
41. For example, the property was sold for the amount due on the note ($12,000 to be
consistent with the example in note 38 supra), but its fair market value was $15,000. The
debtor could not compel the creditor to pay the difference of $3,000, nor could she have the
sale set aside.
42. There is no provision in the legislation that enables a debtor to allege that, if the
property had been sold at fair market value, he or she would be entitled to the excess. For
example, if the balance owed on a note is $100,000, and the property sold for that amount at
the foreclosure sale but had an actual fair market value of $150,000, the debtor cannot claim
the creditor or purchaser owes him or her $50,000.
43. See supra note 5 for text of CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580d.
44. However, one author has pointed out that Spangler v. Memel, 7 Cal. 3d 603, 498
P.2d 1055, 102 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1972), has the potential of breathing new life into Civil Proce-
dure Code section 580a, as the section could now be applied to limit the amount of the sold-out
junior's recovery. See Leipziger, supra note 10, at 753. Professor Leipziger states:
Presumably such a limitation would function by requiring an appraisal of the
value of the property as of the time the senior lien is foreclosed; to the extent
that such an appraisal indicated a value in excess of the bid at the senior sale,
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The Great Depression of the 1930's was the impetus behind
section 580a and the other anti-deficiency legislation that was in-
tended to reduce or eliminate the debtor's personal liability to his or
her secured creditor.45 During the Depression, many debtors were
unable to continue making payments on their notes. After default,
the creditor, frequently the sole bidder at the foreclosure sale, would
purchase the property for an amount far below the amount the
debtor owed on the note. The creditor then obtained personal judg-
ment against the debtor for the balance due, thus making it practi-
cally impossible for the debtor to obtain another mortgage while a
substantial judgment was outstanding against him or her.4 The
Legislature attempted to correct this inequitable situation by enact-
ing section 580a, which was intended to "prevent creditors from buy-
ing in at their own sales at deflated prices and realizing double re-
coveries by holding debtors for large deficiencies. "47
such excess should be deducted from the amount of the judgment made available
to the junior. In other words, the junior lienholder's deficiency is measured by
the difference between the fair market value of the property and the amount of
the combined senior and junior debt.
Id. at 767 n.40.
The problem with the above, of course, is that the junior, to protect itself, must bid cash
at the foreclosure sale. This may be financially impractical. Furthermore, the California courts
have not applied Civil Procedure section 580a in this manner in any reported decisions.
However, in both Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. Bloxham, 176 Cal App. 3d 266, 221
Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985) and Bank of Hemet v. United States, 643 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1981), the
courts concluded that Civil Procedure section 580a would apply to a sold-out junior who was
the successful bidder at the senior's nonjudicial foreclosure sale.
See R. BERNHARDT, supra note 10, § 4.31, at 35. Benjamin, California Fair Value
Limitations Applied to Non-Foreclosing Junior Lienholder, 12 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 317
(1982).
The California Legislature apparently believes section 580a is still viable since it has
amended the statute three times since 1939 when section 580d arguably abrogated its effect.
The amendments all had to do with the language in the section. Prior to 1968, section 580a
read, referring to the compensation of the appraiser appointed by the court to ascertain the fair
market value of the property:
The court must fix compensation of such referee not to exceed five dollars per
day, and expenses for the time actually engaged in such appraisal.
After the 1968 amendment the statute reads:
The court must fix the compensation of such referee in an amount as deter-
mined by the court to be reasonable, but such fees shall not exceed similar fees
for similar services in the community where such services are rendered.
CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580a (West Supp. 1986).
The 1970 amendment substituted inheritance tax "referees" for "appraisers," and the
1982 amendment substituted "probate tax referees" for "inheritance tax referees."
45. Civil Procedure Code sections 580a and 580b were enacted in 1933; section 580d
was enacted in 1939. Civil Procedure Code section 726 was amended in 1933.
46. See, Recent Legislation, 22 CALIF. L. REV. 170, 181-83 (1934).
47. Roseleaf, 59 Cal. 2d at 40, 378 P.2d at 99, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 875. See, e.g., Walker v.
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The author has found no reported California decisions applying
section 580a as the Legislature intended. From 1933, when section
580a was first enacted, until 1939, when section 580d became effec-
tive, the courts refused to apply section 580a to deeds of trust or
mortgages executed prior to the statute's enactment.48 Since the
country was recovering from the Depression throughout those years
when the section had significance (1933-39), it can be surmised that
few deeds of trust were executed in California during that period.
Therefore few, if any, debtors were able to raise section 580a as a
defense to deficiency judgments.
One California court has recently taken the opportunity to ap-
ply section 580a in the context of a sold-out junior who was the high
bidder at the senior foreclosure sale. In Walter E. Heller Western,
Inc. v. Bloxham," the court held that the fair value provisions of
section 580a limited the amount that the junior could recover as a
deficiency judgment. The amount was limited to "the lesser of the
excess of the combined debts of the senior and junior lienholders over
1) the fair market value of the property or 2) the selling price at the
foreclosure sale." 0 The court reasoned that, once a junior chose to
purchase at the senior's sale, it was equitable to impose the fair
value limitations on him in order to bar double recovery - receipt of
both the property at a bargain price and the entire amount due on
his note.6" Since the junior chose to bid and was in fact the high
bidder, he was in control of the price at which the property was sold.
This can be distinguished from the situation in which a junior does
not bid at the senior sale, for "[t]o apply the fair value limitations to
that junior would result in the amount of his deficiency being limited
by the amount of someone else's bid, a factor over which he has no
control.""'
Debtors have also raised section 580a unsuccessfully in the mul-
tiple security context. If a creditor nonjudicially forecloses on only
Community Bank, 10 Cal. 3d 729, 518 P.2d 329, 111 Cal. Rptr. 897 (1974).
48. See, e.g., Miller v. Hart, 11 Cal. 2d 739, 81 P.2d 923 (1938); Central Bank v.
Proctor, 5 Cal. 2d 237, 54 P.2d 718 (1936). The rationale behind the courts' refusal was two-
fold: (1) the statute did not specify that it was to be applied retroactively, and (2) to eliminate
anticipated deficiency judgments would have been a denial of the creditor's contractual rights
under the guise of a change in available remedies. See Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n v. Burg Bros., 31 Cal. App. 2d 352, 88 P.2d 196 (1939).
49. 176 Cal. App. 3d 266, 221 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985). See also Bank of Hemet, 643
F.2d at 667-70.
50. 176 Cal. App. 3d at 273, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
51. Id. at 273-74, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 429-30.
52. Id.
[Vol. 26
CALIFORNIA FORECLOSURE
one parcel of its multiple security and then attempts to sell the re-
maining security to satisfy the balance due on the note, a debtor may
argue that had the first parcel been sold at its fair market value,
there would be no need for the creditor to sell the second parcel.53
For example, two parcels of property secure one $20,000 note. The
debtor defaults. The creditor nonjudicially forecloses on parcel #1
and sells it for $10,000, although its fair market value is $20,000.
The creditor then attempts to sell parcel #2 in order to recoup the
additional $10,000 owed. The debtor might attempt to enjoin the
sale of parcel #2 by arguing that if parcel #1 had been sold for its
fair market value as mandated by section 580a, no balance would be
owed.
This was the plaintiff's contention in Hatch v. Security First
National Bank." In Hatch, the defendants nonjudicially foreclosed
on the primary part of the security. Part of the debt remained unsat-
isfied, and the creditor later foreclosed on the remaining property to
satisfy the balance due on the note. Plaintiff debtors brought a quiet
title action with respect to the property that was sold at the second
sale, contending that the fair market value of the primary security
was sufficient to satisfy the debt. They argued, therefore, that they
owned the remaining security free of the creditor's lien. The plain-
tiffs suggested that section 580a required the defendants to obtain a
judicial determination of the fair market value of the first parcel sold
to determine if there was, in fact, an unpaid balance due on the note
before permitting the second sale. The defendants claimed that sec-
tion 580a only applies when the creditor is seeking a deficiency judg-
ment, defined as a money judgment,5 5 after sale of all secured prop-
erty, and not where the creditor is merely selling additional security.
The court agreed with defendants, holding that the statute allows
debtors to raise fair market value only to limit a money judgment
and does not affect the creditor's right to sell additional security.
Parties relying on section 580a have not fared well in the
courts. The Bloxham and Hatch cases add little meaning to this stat-
ute. At best, section 580a as it now stands is ambiguous; at worst, it
is superseded by section 580d. In order to truly prevent creditors
from realizing double recoveries, the fair value provisions must be
given a new meaning, as will be addressed further in section IV,
below.
53. This situation faced the court in Hatch v. Security First Nat'l Bank, 19 Cal. 2d 254,
120 P.2d 869 (1949).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 260, 120 P.2d at 873.
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B. The Untenable "Purposes" of Section 580b
The purposes of section 580b, as articulated by the California
Supreme Court in the landmark decision of Roseleaf v. Chier-
ighinole are two-fold: (1) to prevent overvaluation of property given
to secure the balance due on a purchase-money note, and (2) to pre-
vent aggravation of an economic depression that would occur if debt-
ors were burdened with personal judgments after losing their prop-
erty through foreclosure.5" The validity of these purposes, which has
been analyzed in numerous other articles,"s is seriously questioned.
Before proposing statutory reform, the author will examine the fac-
tual situation of Roseleaf
56. 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1963).
57. It is interesting to note that neither party in Roseleaf argued that this was section
580b's two-fold purpose in either their District Court of Appeal briefs or the Petition for
Hearing before the California Supreme Court. The briefs are on microfilm at Santa Clara
University law library. The Roseleaf court cites Currie and Lieberman, Purchase-Money
Mortgages and State Lines: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 1960 DUKE L.J. 1, 33-34,
39-40, to support its statement that, "Section 580b places the risk of inadequate security on the
purchase-money mortgagee. A vendor is thus discouraged from overvaluing the security. Preca-
rious land promotion schemes are discouraged, for the security value of the land gives purchas-
ers a clue as to its true market value." 59 Cal. 2d at 42, 378 P.2d at 101, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
The Currie & Lieberman article reviewed several possible explanations behind the legislative
policy of barring deficiency judgments in purchase-money cases. Currie & Lieberman, supra,
at 29-32. The authors note two possibilities: (1) the seller who forecloses a purchase-money
security instrument is usually the purchaser at the sale, and he is restored to his original
position without compensation, since he keeps whatever payments the buyer made, and (2) the
seller has not parted with cash; he is "not lending money but trading - or even 'speculating'
(footnote omitted) - in land." Id. at 30.
They reject the Brown view that "[t]he one taking such a trust deed [i.e., a vendor taking
a purchase-money mortgage] knows the value of his security and assumes the risk that it may
become inadequate." Brown, 41 Cal. 2d at 197, 259 P.2d at 427. Currie and Lieberman
comment, "[t]his is not a particularly convincing explanation of the legislative purpose." Cur-
rie & Lieberman, supra, at 31.
Currie and Lieberman try to ascertain why a vendor would extend credit and conclude
that "the likelihood is that the purchaser is unable to make a down payment sufficient to
satisfy the [lending] agency's loan-value ratio standards." Id. at 33. The vendor may seek "to
compensate himself for the risk that the security is inadequate, as by charging relatively high
interest, or increasing the price." Id.
This is apparently where the Roseleaf court got the overvaluation rationale.
58. The list of law review articles which discuss and criticize the Roseleaf purposes is
extensive. Among the most significant are: Hetland, Deficiency Judgment Limitations in Cali-
fornia - A New Judicial Approach, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 28-31 (1963); Leipziger, supra
note 10, at 753; Rintala (Brudno), California's Anti-deficiency Legislation and Suretyship
Law: The Transversion of Protective Statutory Schemes, 17 UCLA L. REV. 245 (1969).
There is no use repeating extensively what has been done elsewhere, so the discussion here
will be as short as possible.
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1. Roseleaf" Commercial Borrower/Multiple Security
The debtor in Roseleaf had signed four notes, each representing
a fraction of the purchase price for a hotel. One of the notes was
secured by a first deed of trust on the hotel and was not in default.
Three of the notes were secured by second deeds of trust on other
property owned by the debtor. The holder of all of these notes was
the vendor, the Roseleaf Corporation. The security for the three
notes secured by second deeds of trust on the other property became
valueless when the first deeds of trust were foreclosed. The debtor
had likewise defaulted on the seconds held by Roseleaf Corporation,
and the corporation sued the debtor directly on these three notes.
The debtor's defense was that these were purchase-money notes
since they represented a debt incurred by virtue of the purchase of
the hotel, and therefore the corporation could not seek the balance
due on these notes. According to the debtor, this would be a defi-
ciency judgment prohibited by section 580b. This defense was based
on Brown v. Jensen,5' which also involved a sold-out junior, and in
which the sold-out junior was prohibited from suing on the note,
since the note was determined to be "purchase-money" within the
meaning of section 580b. In Brown, however, the creditor had taken
a second deed of trust on the property sold, not on additional security
as in Roseleaf
The court in Roseleaf allowed the creditor to sue directly on the
notes, since it determined that the purposes of section 580b would
not be contravened by allowing this deficiency." The Court found no
evidence that the hotel had been overvalued, and in fact, correctly
noted that, had the debtor been protected from suit on the three notes
by section 580b, he would have been able to obtain the hotel for less
than the agreed-upon price by simply keeping up his payments on
the note secured by the first deed of trust on the hotel.61
The Roseleaf result can be attacked on two bases. First, the
pertinent language of the statute in effect at the time Roseleaf was
decided stated, "[n]o deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after
any sale of real property for failure of the purchaser to complete his
contract of sale, or under a deed of trust, or mortgage, given to se-
cure payment of the balance of the purchase price of real
property.."62
59. 41 Cal. 2d 193, 259 P.2d 425 (1953).
60. Roseleaf, 59 Cal. 2d at 42, 378 P.2d at 101, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
61. Id. at 42-43, 378 P.2d at 101, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
62. Id.
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This is easily susceptible of an interpretation that would bar a
deficiency judgment after the sale of the additional security in
Roseleaf Where security is given to secure payment of the balance of
the purchase price of real property, the statute does not require that
the property sold be the property that was purchased.
More importantly, the creditor's request for additional security
could easily indicate the property being sold is overvalued. A creditor
who insists that the debtor give additional security may very well be
uncertain or skeptical about the value of his or her property. Had
the hotel in Roseleaf actually been worth $200,000, and had the
debtor paid $40,000 down, the creditor should have had no hesitancy
in accepting a note for $160,000 secured by a first deed of trust on
the hotel. But if, in reality, the hotel was only worth $100,000, but
the purchase price was $200,000, the seller probably would not ac-
cept $40,000 down with a note for $160,000 because it would leave
the seller with insufficient security."' Instead, the seller might take
the $40,000, accept a note for $60,000, secured by a first deed of
trust on the hotel," and then require the buyer to provide notes for
the remaining $100,000 debt, secured by other property.65
Thus, the request for additional security could very well be an
indication of overvaluation, a result which the application of section
580b might avoid. If the creditor could not get a deficiency on the
notes secured by additional property, he or she would arguably have
less incentive to overvalue the property sold. Since Roseleaf allows
the deficiency, overvaluation may actually be encouraged."'
63. On the other hand, a seller may secure the balance of the $200,000 purchase price
on a hotel with a $100,000 fair market value by accepting $40,000 down and a $160,000 note.
If the buyer defaulted, the seller could foreclose and enter a credit bid of up to $160,000,
depending on the balance due on the note at the time of foreclosure. The seller would retain
the $40,000 down payment and, if he or she is the high bidder at the sale, would have prop-
erty with a fair market value of $100,000. By overvaluing the security initially, the seller could
make $140,000 on property worth $100,000. The bar against obtaining a deficiency would not
discourage this.
64. This would leave the seller with a margin of security. Depending on how great a
margin of security the seller wanted and what the value of the debtor's other property was, the
amount of the note secured by the property purchased could be reduced, and the amount
secured by other property increased. The seller may be willing to accept a note for up to
$100,000, the full market value of the property, but this would leave the seller with no margin
of security.
65. This is typically referred to as "fragmented" of "fractionalized" debt; that is, a debt
which is split into separate notes. Each note may be secured by a separate deed of trust, or one
note may be secured and another unsecured. Roseleaf involved this type of debt. See R. BERN-
HARDT, supra note 10, §§ 2.58-2.61, at 61-66; Leipziger, supra note 10, at 758 n.20.
66. One could argue that a creditor in the Roseleaf situation requests additional secur-
ity, not because the hotel at the time of sale is overvalued, but because of the fear that the
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There was no discussion by the court in Roseleaf about the stat-
ute's second purpose, how the transaction would or would not pre-
vent further economic decline."7 Apparently, the court felt no need to
discuss this, as it is only relevant in a declining market where debt-
ors as a class may be burdened with both loss of the property fi-
nanced and large personal liabilities.
2. Brown: Residential Borrower/Single Security
Numerous commentators contend that Roseleaf severely under-
cuts Brown v. Jensen. 8 However, as noted previously, Brown in-
volved a second deed of trust on the property purchased, whereas in
Roseleaf, the seconds were given on property other than the parcel
purchased. Two views of the Brown transaction are possible. One is
that the property in Brown could not have been overvalued, as the
seller agreed to take a second, obviously believing the value of the
property to be sufficient to cover the note. The vendor "knows the
value of his security and assumes the risk that it may become inade-
quate.".6  However, third-party lenders are in a better position to
know the value of the security they are taking than is the average
vendor.70 Therefore, it is difficult to understand why section 580b
does not apply to third-party lenders if, as stated in Roseleaf, the
section was intended to prevent overvaluation. Furthermore, if a
seller is sold-out by a senior's foreclosure sale as in Brown, why
should that seller automatically be barred from suing on his or her
note? There was no overvaluation initially, and the seller may sim-
ply not have been in the financial position to bid cash at the senior
debtor-purchaser may not have the business skill to keep the business operating at its present
value. Certainly, the profits of such an enterprise are taken into consideration in setting the
purchase price. This, however, was not discussed by the court in Roseleaf
The Roseleaf purpose to prevent overvaluation is achieved if the buyer, by the vendor's
request for additional security, is put on notice that the purchase price is questionable. This
assumes the buyer will refuse to go ahead with the purchase, and the vendor will thus be
unable to sell his property at the inflated price. See R. BERNHARDT, supra note 10, § 4.24, at
157-58; Rintala, supra note 58, at 261-62; Leipziger, supra note 10, at 762 n.31.
67. The only sentences referring to economic decline in Roseleaf state:
If inadequacy of the security results, not from overvaluing, but from a decline in
property values during a general or local depression, section 580b prevents the
aggravation of the downturn that would result if defaulting purchasers were
burdened with a large personal liability. Section 580b thus serves as a stabiliz-
ing factor in land sales.
59 Cal. 2d at 42, 378 P.2d at 101, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 877.
68. Most significant among them is Professor John Hetland. See J. HETLAND, supra
note 10, §§ 6.29-6.34, at 280-90. See also R. BERNHARDT, supra note 10, § 4.23, at 156.
69. Brown, 41 Cal. 2d at 197, 259 P.2d at 427.
70. See Currie & Lieberman, supra note 57, at 31-32.
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sale.
On the other hand, the Brown vendor may have purposely over-
valued the property, hoping that the debtor would pay the entire
amount represented by the note.' A vendor in such a situation has
nothing to lose by overvaluing; even if he is aware that no deficiency
is obtainable, he may consciously take a calculated risk that the
buyer will pay the full note. Traditionally, real property values in-
crease over time; a purchaser who agrees to pay an overvalued price
for property may find that property to be worth that price in a few
years. In such a situation, a default would be economically un-
sound.7' The fact that no deficiency is available does not discourage
the vendor from overvaluing the property.
The inevitable conclusion is either that preventing overvaluation
of property was never intended to be achieved through the applica-
tion of section 580b or, even if the Legislature intended such a pur-
pose, application of the section does not achieve that end. Sellers may
overvalue property even if they cannot obtain a deficiency in the
hope that the purchase price will eventually be paid in full, or they
may overvalue property by securing the balance of the purchase
price with property other than that sold and be able to get a defi-
ciency on those notes. In either case, section 580b does not prevent
overvaluation. As applied in Roseleaf, it may even encourage it.
3. Spangler: Commercial Borrower / Subordination
The California Supreme Court reaffirmed Brown's validity in
Spangler v. Memel.7 In Spangler, the seller subordinated her
purchase-money deed of trust to a construction loan that was used to
build an office building on the property purchased from the seller,
whereas in Brown, the loan was secured by a second on what was
apparently residential property.74 Spangler permitted the sold-out
junior to sue on her note after the holder of the first had foreclosed
71. See infra note 72.
72. For example, in 1982 a debtor agreed to pay $100,000 for a house which had a fair
market value of $75,000. He paid $10,000 down and owed $90,000. He makes payments on
the note for three years. The house, in 1985, may easily be worth the $100,000 he agreed to
pay for it in 1982. The probability of a buyer defaulting decreases as the market value in-
creases. If the vendor in this example carried the balance of the purchase price, he has little to
fear from the fact that he cannot obtain a deficiency.
73. 7 Cal. 3d 603, 498 P.2d 1055, 102 Cal. Rptr. 807 (1972). Professor Leipziger ana-
lyzes Spangler in depth in his article, supra note 10.
74. The Brown opinion itself gives no indication as to whether the property was resi-
dential or commercial. However, the court in Spangler implied it was residential. 7 Cal. 3d at
609-11, 498 P.2d at 1058-59, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 810-11.
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on the property.
The Spangler court, applying the purposes of section 580b as
first put forth in Roseleaf, concluded these purposes would be best
met by allowing the seller to obtain a deficiency in this non-standard
transaction. The rationale was that, since the buyer is the one con-
structing and developing the property, it is the buyer/developer and
not the seller who controls its fair market value. The seller cannot
rely on the security value of the property when he agrees to
subordinate his security, since the value of the unconstructed build-
ing is speculative at best. Because the seller has no way of calculat-
ing the fair market value of the property once construction is com-
pleted, he cannot overvalue the property, and thus there is no reason
to deny him a deficiency.75
The Spangler court, in giving the vendor who subordinates to a
buyer/developer the right to a deficiency, molded its reasoning to fit
Roseleafs overvaluation rationale. To do this, it was forced to look
at the transaction from the buyer/developer perspective, deciding
that if the buyer/developer were held liable in this context, it would
be unlikely to overvalue proposed construction. Supposedly, the fear
of personal liability on the seller's subordinated note will encourage
the buyer/developer to ensure that the fair market value of the prop-
erty after it is built will equal or exceed the balance due on the notes
for which the property is security.
While this fear of personal liability may influence some devel-
opers, it is unlikely that this is a significant factor in their decision-
making process. 76 Developers who are undercapitalized are fre-
quently unconcerned about their personal liability. Financially
strong developers will either shield themselves from liability by hav-
ing a corporate entity purchase the property and sign the note77 or
will avoid risky projects altogether. It is questionable whether impos-
ing personal liability will discourage overvaluation in this context.
Spangler also examined Roseleafs second purpose - prevent-
ing the aggravation of an economic depression - but considered this
purpose to have little applicability.78 The court reasoned that, since
neither the buyer nor the subordinated seller will have the property
after the holder of the first forecloses, the buyer/developer in this
context should bear the cost of the unpaid portion of the purchase
75. 7 Cal. 3d at 611, 498 P.2d at 1059-60, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 811-12.
76. Professor Leipziger's discussion of this aspect of Spangler is excellent. Leipziger,
supra note 10, at 769-71.
77. Id. at 770-71.
78. 7 Cal. 3d at 614, 498 P.2d at 1062, 102 Cal. Rptr. at 814.
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price. This view does not take into consideration the Roseleaf court's
view that the imposition of loss of the property and personal liability
on the buyer increase the effects of an economic depression. Spangler
apparently views this double loss as a neutral factor without in any
way distinguishing subordinated sellers in the commercial context
from other sellers who take back junior liens. 7 9
4. Budget Realty: Commercial Borrower/ Unexercised
Subordination
The issue of sellers who subordinate their liens to construction
financing also came up in Budget Realty v. Hunter.80 In this case,
the buyer purchased commercial property, taking it subject to an ex-
isting first deed of trust. The seller carried back a second deed of
trust on the property. The seller also agreed to subordinate its liens
to construction financing which was not to exceed $400,000.00. The
subordination agreement for construction financing was never
exercised.
The buyer defaulted on the senior deed of trust, and the senior
nonjudicially foreclosed on the property. The seller was sold out and
filed suit to recover on the note. The buyer claimed that there was no
recovery because the note was purchase-money, and the buyer was
consequently protected by section 580b. 8'
The seller, of course, contended that because of the subordina-
tion agreement, this case fell within the exception to section 580b
that was articulated in Spangler. The court, however, held that with
an unexercised subordination agreement, the transaction retains its
purchase-money character." The Budget Realty court analyzed the
Spangler decision but was not persuaded that the Spangler result
was mandated by the Roseleaf purposes (i.e. overvaluation and ag-
gravation of economic downturn)." Instead, according to the Budget
Realty court, Spangler required that the seller be allowed to obtain a
deficiency because of the unique risks a seller takes when subordi-
nating to a construction loan. Construction loans are generally large
and usually far exceed the price paid for the land. If the buyer de-
faults, the seller may not be able to keep the senior current. These
79. Leipziger, supra note 10, at 766 n.37. See also Professor Leipziger's discussion of
the problems that juniors, who do not fall within the Spangler factual context, face in attempt-
ing to reinstate defaults on senior notes. d. at 777-78.
80. 157 Cal. App. 3d 511, 204 Cal. Rpir. 48 (1984).
81. Id. at 513, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 49.
82. Id. at 517, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
83. Id. at 515-16, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 50-51.
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additional burdens on the seller only arise after subordination.84
The Budget Realty8" court was one of the few courts to analyze
a purchase-money transaction without relying on the Roseleaf pur-
poses. Instead, the court took a pragmatic approach and considered
how the specific fact pattern was similar to or different from the
typical purchase-money situation. The court determined that there
was no practical reason to protect the seller in this instance.86 Also,
the court noted the commercial character of the property and recog-
nized that commercial transactions should perhaps be outside of the
scope of section 580b. Nonetheless, the court adopted a hands-off
stance, rightfully concluding that it is up to the Legislature to amend
the statute if this is its intention. 87
5. Prunty: Residential Borrower/ Construction Loan
The court of appeal in Prunty v. Bank of America88 recognized
the plight of the residential purchaser more directly than has the
California Supreme Court to date. Prunty did not involve a sold-out
junior and is therefore distinguishable from Brown, Roseleaf and
Spangler in this regard. But it did involve residential borrowers who
had constructed their home on a fully paid for lot through a loan
obtained from Bank of America. The home was subsequently de-
stroyed by a landslide, and the borrowers sought a declaratory judg-
ment that they were protected from a deficiency judgment by section
580b. The court, in holding for the borrowers, concluded that this
would discourage overvalued construction lending, since banks and
other lenders, knowing they could not sue on the note, would lend
only as much as the finished building would be worth.
The court, in insisting on conforming its reasoning to Roseleafs
purposes, again failed to look at the realities of construction lend-
ing.89 Established construction lenders do not lend more than the
property will be worth after construction. Construction lenders mate-
rially analyze the costs of construction prior to making the loan, and
then oversee the progress of construction by releasing specific
amounts of the loan as needed. Should it ever appear that the funds
are not being used to increase the value of the property, further dis-
bursements will not be made. The lender in the Prunty situation
84. Id. at 516-17, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 517, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
87. Id.
88. 37 Cal. App. 3d 430, 112 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1974).
89. See Leipziger, supra note 10, at 785.
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also has the fully paid for lot as security. This makes it highly un-
likely that the amount of the loan will exceed the value of the com-
pleted residence and lot. The motivating factor of preventing overval-
uation is not met by barring a deficiency in this context. It is sound
construction lending practices that discourage overvaluation.
The Prunty court also addressed the economic stabilization pur-
pose of section 580b but, instead of applying it in the context of the
economy as a whole as originally envisioned in Roseleaf, applied it
to the Pruntys individually. Its reasoning was that if the Pruntys, or
borrowers like them, were held liable for a deficiency after losing
their home, the economic consequences to them would be extreme.
The bank can best bear the risk of such economic disaster, and it did,
after all, have the opportunity to oversee the construction plans and
thus could have protected itself.90
The rationale becomes questionable when carried over to other
situations covered by section 580b. As Professor Leipziger com-
ments, 1 there is nothing in section 580b to prevent a third party
lender of funds for a commercial building which is destroyed by a
landslide from collecting a deficiency. However, a vendor who carries
a junior lien for the balance of the purchase price secured by com-
mercial property which is subsequently destroyed is not permitted to
90. The court did not draw a distinction between the sold-out junior vendor in Spangler
and the institutional lender in Prunty. In Spangler, as discussed supra in notes 73-79 and
accompanying text, the subordinated junior vendor was not charged with knowledge of what
the completed structure's value would be, whereas in Prunty, the sophisticated institutional
lender was.
Two other cases deserve mention. In Goodyear v. Mack, 159 Cal. App. 3d 654, 205 Cal.
Rptr. 702 (1984), a California appellate court held that a note which was originally purchase-
money lost its purchase-money protection when it was refinanced, and the new note was se-
cured by property other than that purchased. The court examined the facts in the case in light
of the purposes articulated in Roseleaf, but concluded that a deficiency judgment should be
granted.
First, the court noted that there was no evidence that the seller overvalued the property.
The refinanced note was secured by property other than that purchased, and there was no
reason to assume that the seller had a greater knowledge of the value of this land than the
buyers did. Second, the court reasoned that imposing a deficiency judgment would not cause an
aggravated economic downturn, but instead would only insure that the buyers paid the
purchase price to which they had agreed.
The court also noted that, technically, a refinanced loan is not purchase-money. In such a
situation, the money is not borrowed from a seller of property or for the purchase of a one-to-
four unit dwelling, but is instead borrowed to pay off an existing loan. In Union Bank v.
Wendland, 54 Cal. App. 3d 393, 126 Cal. Rptr. 549 (1976), the court of appeal held that
debtors who refinanced the loan on their residence lost section 580b's purchase-money protec-
tion against a deficiency judgment. The court, in so deciding, simply stated: "The loan transac-
tions . . . are variations from the standard that do not come within the purpose of section
580b." Id. at 399-400, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 554.
91. Leipziger, supra note 10, at 786.
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sue on his note under a literal construction of the statute. Yet that
seller may very well be in the position of the seller in Spangler: the
first lien is large and therefore cannot easily be reinstated or paid off,
and thus the seller is without a remedy.
The Prunty court reached the correct conclusion when viewed
from the residential/commercial distinction, but its reliance on the
Roseleaf purposes weakens the analysis. The court would have done
a greater service to the residential homeowner by simply relying on
the legislative intent as deduced from the 1963 amendment to section
580b.92
6. Nickerman: Nonstandard Purchase-Money Transaction
In Nickerman v. Ryan," the court granted plaintiff a deficiency
judgment on a secured note given pursuant to an agreement resulting
from a divorce decree. The plaintiff conveyed her interest, as a ten-
ant in common, to her husband in certain parcels of land and took
back a second deed of trust on the property. When the senior fore-
closed on the first deed of trust, she sued on the underlying note.
Defendant contended that he was immune from a deficiencyjudgment (under section 580b) because the second deed of trust rep-
resented a purchase-money note. He claimed that his ex-wife quali-
fied as a vendor in the transaction by selling her interest in the prop-
erty to him and by taking back a $25,000 deed of trust on the
property. The court disagreed with the defendant, and held that the
note was not given to secure the balance of the purchase price of
property. It was intended to equalize the division of a community
property settlement and was thus not subject to the anti-deficiency
legislation."
The court, in relying on Spangler v. Memel,95 stated that the
transaction "is such a variation on the standard purchase money
92. The court in Prunty analyzed the 1963 amendment in detail and concluded that the
amendment required section 580b's protection to extend to residential construction borrowers.
It relied on the fact that prior to 1963, section 580b simply stated that "[n]o deficiency judg-
ment shall lie in any event after any sale under a deed of trust or mortgage given to secure
payment of the balance of the purchase price of real property." In 1963, the Legislature
amended section 580b to include money advanced by third party lenders used to purchase a
one-to-four unit dwelling occupied by the purchaser. The use of the words "lender" and
"dwelling" in the 1963 amendment allowed the Prunty court to conclude that the Legislature
intended to protect residential purchaser-borrowers. See also R. BERNHARDT, supra note 10, §
4.26, at 160-61.
93. 93 Cal. App. 3d 564, 155 Cal. Rptr. 830 (1979).
94. Id. at 566-67, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
95. 7 Cal. 3d 603, 498 P.2d 1055, 102 Cal. Rptr 807 (1972).
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mortgage or deed of trust transaction that it would not subserve the
purposes of section 580b . . . to deny a deficiency judgment." '96 The
court then proceeded to apply principles of Spangler and concluded
that it would be unfair to place the risk of the business venture upon
the vendor who sold her interest in order to free herself from the
risks and responsibilities of management of the property. The court
also felt that there was no reason to assume that the seller had supe-
rior knowledge of the value of the property sold.
97
The California courts have struggled to apply Roseleafs analy-
sis to achieve protection for the residential purchaser. In Roseleaf
and Spangler, where commercial transactions were involved, the
sold-out juniors were permitted to sue on their notes. In Brown, pre-
sumably a residential situation,' 8 and in Prunty, this was not so.
The effort to protect the residential owners has led to rationales
based on the Roseleaf purposes which do not withstand close scru-
tiny." Those purposes should be abandoned, and the real purpose,
protection of the residential purchaser, should be articulated and
promoted.
C. The "One-Action Rule" of Section 726
The purpose of the "one-action rule" contained in section 726 is
to protect the debtor from unnecessary personal liability by requiring
the creditor to exhaust real property security before obtaining a
judgment against a debtor personally. 00 Under this section, the
debtor may challenge a creditor who fails to foreclose on the prop-
erty in two ways. First, he or she may raise section 726 as an affirm-
ative defense in a judicial foreclosure action." This will require the
creditor to foreclose on secured property first. If the debtor does not
compel the creditor to foreclose on all the security first by raising
section 726 as an affirmative defense, the creditor should still be able
to obtain a deficiency.10 Of course, after the creditor has elected the
96. 93 Cal. App. 3d at 566.67, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
97. See R. BERNHARDT, supra note 10, § 4.32, at 35-36.
98. See supra note 74.
99. See supra note 58 for other commentators who agree with the author.
100. See Walker v. Community Bank, 10 CaL. 3d 729, 735-36, 518 P.2d 329, 335, 111
Cal. Rptr. 897, 901 (1974).
101. See Salter v. Ulrich, 22 Cal. 2d 263, 138 P.2d 7 (1943).
102. There is some dispute as to whether a creditor who does not exhaust all the secur-
ity in one action is still entitled to a deficiency judgment. Professor Hetland, without explana-
tion, says that the creditor is not entitled to a deficiency. J. HETLAND, supra note 10, § 6.18,
at 257-58. Professor Hetland is cited with approval as to this point in Walker, 10 Cal. 3d at
733 n.2, 518 P.2d at 331 n.2, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 899-900 n.2. It is the author's contention that
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remedy of personal action, the debtor may raise the "sanction" as-
pect of section 726.1 8 The creditor is thus subsequently estopped
from ever going after the security to satisfy the debt.
In the recent case of Bank of America v. Daily, 0" however, a
California appellate court applied section 726 in a manner which
was advantageous to the debtor but unfair to the creditor. In Daily,
the bank held a $340,000 promissory note which was secured by
both the debtor's common stock and an interest in real property.
When the loan was in default, the bank sold the pledged stock at a
private sale and setoff $10,000 from the Dailys' checking account to
pay accrued interest. Approximately $170,000 remained to be paid
on the debt. At this time, the bank sued to judicially foreclose on the
real property. The court barred the foreclosure and prohibited any
deficiency.
The holding of the Daily court must be closely questioned. Af-
ter reviewing a California Supreme Court case from 1897, the court
determined that a bank setoff was an "action" within the meaning of
section 726, and therefore, the bank was estopped from resorting to
the real property security.' 0 5 The debtors had successfully raised the
"sanction" effect of section 726. The court further held that the bank
could not get a deficiency judgment.' 06 The court wrote that "[tjhe
harshness flowing from applying section 726 as a sanction is neces-
sary to uphold the statutory policy of protecting debtors' rights.'"0
Under the statute, however, the creditor is only estopped from going
after the secured property to collect the debt; it should not be pre-
vented from obtaining a deficiency judgment.
The harsh and erroneous decision in Daily illustrates the ambi-
guity of section 726's sanction effect. The Daily case also indicates a
need to define more narrowly the term "action" within the "one-
action" rule.
The Legislature has recently attempted to clarify the applica-
tion of the "one-action" rule in the multiple security context. 06
Commercial Code section 9501, effective January 1, 1986, allows a
there is no justification for such a double sanction. See discussion of Bank of America v. Daily,
152 Cal. App. 3d 767, 199 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1984) in Rowan & Mertens, Bank of America v.
Daily: Setoff Versus Right to Foreclose, 8 CEB REAL PROPERTY LAW REPORTER 73 (1985).
103. See Walker, 10 Cal. 3d at 735-36, 111 Cal Rptr. at 901.
104. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 767, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 557. For a critical analysis of the Daily
decision, see Rowan & Mertens, supra note 102, at 73.
105. 152 Cal. App. 3d at 771, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
106. Id. at 773, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 560.
107. Id. at 772, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 560. See Rowan & Mertens, supra note 102.
108. CAL. COM. CODE § 9501(4) (West 1964 & Supp. 1986).
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creditor holding both personal and real property as security for a
single obligation, to either foreclose on the personal property collat-
eral independent of the real property, or to foreclose on both the
personal and real property in accordance with the rules applicable to
real property. If a creditor judicially forecloses solely on the personal
property, and does not obtain a monetary judgment, the sanction ef-
fect of section 726 no longer bars an attempt to proceed against the
real property.
Section 9501 fails to specifically address the Daily situation be-
cause the bank account in Daily was not pledged as security. The
section does, however, state that a "judicial action shall not constitute
an action within the meaning of section 726 if and only if a mone-
tary judgment on the debt is sought against the debtor."' Thus,
had the Daily facts included a multiple security situation, the bank
offset would not have been an "action" for the purposes of the one-
action rule of section 726.
III. RECENT LEGISLATION PROTECTING RESIDENTIAL
PURCHASERS
As an examination of recent legislation will show, the Califor-
nia Legislature has established a trend in recent years to make spe-
cial provisions for residential owners, as distinguished from commer-
cial owners of real property. Although there are minor
inconsistencies in the recent statutes (i.e., in some places the lan-
guage refers to "single-family, owner-occupied dwelling"'11 and in
other places to "one-to-four family residence""'1 ), the intent of the
Legislature is obviously to provide extra protection for residential
property owners in certain circumstances.
A. Impound Accounts
Provisions regulating impound accounts11" for single-family
owner-occupied dwellings were codified by the 
California Legisla-
ture in Civil Code section 2954 as early as 1961.118 Thus, even prior
109. d.
110. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2949, 2954, 2954.4 (West Supp. 1986).
111. Id. at §§ 2924.6, 2954.2, 2954.8, 2954.9.
112. An impound account is an account containing money for the payment of taxes,
insurance, homeowner's assessments and such. A percentage of the amount due is paid
monthly along with the mortgage payment by the debtor. Impound accounts are regulated by
Civil Code sections 2954 and 2954.8. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2954, 2954.8 (West Supp. 1986).
See also id. at §§ 2954.1, 2954.2.
113. Civil Code sections 2954(a) and (c) state in part:
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to Roseleaf Corp. v. Chierighino"' and the subsequent amendment
of section 580b defining a purchase-money mortgage, the Legislature
was making special provisions for residential property owners. Civil
Code section 2954 provides that impound accounts can only be re-
quired in certain situations; for example, when the amount of the
loan is 90% of the sale price. The statute also provides that the bene-
ficiary must account to the debtor for money received. However, it
affords protection only if the loan is procured for a "single-family,
owner-occupied dwelling," and the borrower will occupy the dwell-
ing within 90 days of the loan. Although there is no section which
extends the definition to include one-to-four unit residential dwell-
ings, 1 ' the statute clearly falls within a class of statutes which the
Legislature has enacted to protect residential homeowners who have
mortgages and deeds of trust secured by their property.
A companion statute, Civil Code section 2954.8,116 requires
(a) No impound, trust or other type of account for payment of taxes on the
property, insurance premiums or other purposes relating to the property shall
be required as a condition of a real property sale contract or a loan secured by a
deed of trust or mortgage on real property containing only a single-family,
owner-occupied dwelling, except [in 5 specified cases] ...
(c) As used in this section, "single-family, owner-occupied dwelling" means
a dwelling which will be owned and occupied by a signatory to the mortgage or
deed of trust secured by such dwelling within 90 days of the execution of such
mortgage or deed of trust.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 2954(a), (c) (West Supp. 1986). Civil Code section 2954(b) provides that
the lender must furnish an itemized accounting of the disbursements from the impound ac-
count if requested to do so.
114. 59 Cal. 2d 35, 378 P.2d 97, 27 Cal. Rptr. 873 (1963).
115. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2924.6, 2954.2, 2954.8, 2954.9 (West Supp. 1986).
116. Civil Code sections 2954.8(a) and (b) state:
(a) Every financial institution that makes loans upon the security of real
property containing only a one to four-family [sic] residence and located in this
state or purchases obligations secured by such property and that receives money
in advance for payment of taxes and assessments on the property, shall pay
interest on the amount so held to the borrower. The interest on such amounts
shall be at the rate of at least 2 percent simple interest per annum. Such interest
shall be credited to the borrower's account annually or upon termination of such
account, whichever is earlier.
(b) No financial institution subject to the provisions of this section shall
impose any fee or charge in connection with the maintenance or disbursement of
money received in advance for the payment of taxes and assessments of real
property securing loans made by such financial institution, or for the payment
of insurance, or for other purposes relating to such real property, that will re-
sult in an interest rate of less than 2 percent per annum being paid on the
moneys so received.
CAL. CIv. CODE § 2954.8(a), (b) (West Supp. 1986). Civil Code section 2954.8(c) defines
"financial institution." Section 2954.8(d) exempts certain loans from the section's
requirements.
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creditors to pay interest on money held in impound accounts if the
account has been established for purposes related to residential prop-
erty. This section, passed in 1976, applies to loans executed on and
after January 1, 1977. Instead of the phrase "single-family, owner-
occupied dwelling" used in Civil Code section 2954, Civil Code sec-
tion 2954.8 defines residential property as a "one-to-four family resi-
dence." Nor does this section mention that the owner must occupy
within 90 days of execution of the mortgage or deed of trust. In fact,
under the definition used in Civil Code section 2954.8, it is unclear
whether a person need occupy the dwelling at all in order to receive
protection. The section is mute on this point, but in light of its com-
panion section relating to impound accounts,"17 the omission appears
to be a legislative oversight. The minor differences in language and
the lack of clarity with respect to occupancy should not detract from
the purposes behind the legislative scheme: namely, special protec-
tion for residential home purchasers.
B. Pre-Payment Charges
Civil Code section 2954.9,116 enacted in 1974, provides that the
principle and interest on any loan secured by a mortgage or deed of
trust on a residential property of four units or less' 1 may be prepaid
without penalty after five years from the date of execution, or may
be prepaid with certain, specified penalties within the first five
years.120 Once again, the Legislature has enacted special provisions
for the residential owner.
The amendment of this section made by the 1979-80 Regular Session of the Legislature
shall only apply to loans executed on or after January 1, 1980.
117. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2954(a), (c) (Wesi Supp. 1986). See supra note 113 for the text
of the statute.
118. CAL. Civ. CODE § 2954.9 (West Supp. 1986).
119. Section 2954.9 was amended in 1979 to define residential property as "property of
four units or less" instead of "single-family, owner-occupied." Perhaps this is an attempt to
bring some consistency to the residential protection statutes.
120. There are numerous reasons why borrowers may wish to prepay their loans. The
principal reason is that the home which is security for the loan is sold. Generally the note is
paid in full when the new purchasers obtain their loan, thus triggering a potential prepayment
penalty. The original borrower may wish to refinance the loan due to a decrease in interest
rates. A borrower may desire to refinance in order to pay off the first loan, yet capitalize on
the equity, thus permitting the borrower to put extra cash in the bank. See Union Bank v.
Wendland, discussed in note 90 supra. However, under the Union Bank v. Wendland holding,
borrowers with purchase-money loans who refinance, will lose their purchase-money
protection.
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C. Late Charges
Civil Code section 2954.4, passed in 1975, limits the late pay-
ment charges for installments on mortgages or deeds of trust secured
by a single-family, owner-occupied dwelling to either (1) six percent
of the installment due or (2) five dollars, whichever is greater."'
This section protects owners of "single-family, owner-occupied
dwellings," but does not refer to the "one-to-four family residence"
terminology of sections 2954.8 and 2954.9. The Legislature has
passed no companion section, limiting the late charges on commercial
property loans. Here, as in previously discussed code sections, the
homeowner has been granted extra protection as compared to the
commercial owner.
D. Liquidated Damages
Civil Code section 1675, operative July 1, 1978, governs liqui-
dated damage clauses in the purchase and sale contract for residen-
tial property. 22 If the amount specified as liquidated damages is
limited to three percent of the purchase price it is presumed valid.
The burden of proving its unreasonableness is placed on the
buyer. "' If the amount is more than three percent of the purchase
price, the clause is presumed invalid. However, the party seeking to
uphold it can establish its reasonableness and rebut the presump-
tion." 4 The section specifically defines "residential real property" as
property that contains not more than four residential units and prop-
erty that "at the time the contract to purchase and sell is made, the
buyer intends to occupy as his residence."' This last provision
clearly segregates the treatment of residential property from that of
commercial.
E. Duty of Broker to Inspect Residential Real Property
Civil Code section 2079, effective January 1, 1986, requiresbrokers selling property of "one-to-four dwelling units" to conduct
an inspection of that property and disclose to prospective buyers any
facts affecting the value or desirability of the property that such an
inspection reveals." Thus, the Legislature has shown its intent to
121. CAL. CIv. CODE § 2954.4(a) (West Supp. 1986).
122. Id. at § 1675 (West 1985).
123. Id. at § 1675(c).
124. Id. at § 1675(d).
125. Id. at § 1675(a).
126. Id. at § 2079 (West Supp. 1986).
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provide residential home purchasers with protection not expressly
given to purchasers of commercial property.
F. Disclosures Upon Transfer of Residential Property
Civil Code section 1134.5, effective July 1, 1985, requires sell-
ers of real property containing one-to-four residential units to pro-
vide the prospective buyer with a written statement specifying what,
if any, structural additions, alterations or repairs were made during
the seller's ownership and whether they were made with the appro-
priate permits. 117
Effective January 1, 1987, sellers of real property of "not less
than one nor more than four dwelling units" must disclose any con-
ditions affecting the property or defects in items on the property as
specified in Civil Code section 1102.6.1" The Legislature has actu-
ally provided the required disclosure form which lists in great detail,
the disclosures that must be made.1 " With this provision the Legis-
lature demonstrates, once again, great concern for the residential
home purchaser.
G. Other Legislation Protecting Residential Owners
Specific statutes' 80 govern lenders who offer adjustable rate
mortgages that are secured by "residential real property occupied or
intended to be occupied by the borrower the principal improvements
upon which consist of a dwelling or dwellings for not more than four
families."' 18 Effective January 1, 1986, lenders offering such mort-
gages must give prospective borrowers a copy of the most recent pub-
lication of the Federal Reserve Board that provides the public with
information concerning adjustable rate mortgages.
Civil Code section 2948.5, effective January 1, 1986, prohibits
lenders of money secured by a deed of trust on property improved
with one-to-four residential dwelling units from accruing interest on
the loan prior to close of escrow.'
H. Summary
As the above survey illustrates, recent California legislation fo-
127. ld. at § 1134.5(a).
128. Id. at § 1102.6.
129. Id.
130. Id. at §§ 1921, 2948.5.
131. Id. at § 1918(a)(6) (West 1985).
132. Id. at § 2948.5.
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cuses on the distinction between owners of residential property and
owners of commercial real property. The Legislature has established
a public policy of protecting home purchasers. The majority of the
statutes define "residential" as "single-family, owner-occupied" in
order to protect homeowners as opposed to home speculators. By
passing statutes with special provisions that apply only to residential
purchasers, the Legislature has provided guidelines for the revision
of section 580b. The Roseleaf purposes should be abandoned in favor
of a residential/commercial dichotomy.
IV. PROPOSED STATUTORY REVISIONS
A. Revitalizing the Fair Value Provisions of Section 580a
The enactment of section 580d in 1939 brought the demise of
the fair value provisions of section 580a.' 83 Yet, in some common
real property foreclosure situations those provisions would be fair
and useful today. In order to bring the fair value principle back to
life, the author has totally rewritten section 580a, applying it in two
important contexts.
First, fair value is rewritten to be a defense to nonjudicial fore-
closure on multiple security, i.e. the Hatch scenario." 4 Contrary to
the holding in that case, revised section 580a(1) gives the debtor the
right to challenge in court the selling price of one parcel of the secur-
ity, thereby making possible the release or partial release of the re-
maining security.
The second proposed application of the fair value concept limits
deficiencies against guarantors. Under proposed section 580a(2),
proving that the fair market value of the security is higher than the
sale price will enable the guarantor to limit the deficiency amount to
the difference between the proven fair market value and the amount
due on the note.
Finally, to ensure that the new fair value remedies are effective
and not emasculated by delay, section 580a(3) would establish prior-
ity for such proceedings.
The text and analysis of the proposed section 580a revisions
follow.
133. See supra note 10.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
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1. Code of Civil Procedure Section 580a(1)1"5
a. Proposed Text of Section 580a(1)
NON-JUDICIAL SALES OF MULTIPLE SECURITY
Whenever one obligation is secured by one or more deeds
of trust or mortgages on two or more parcels of real property,
following the nonjudicial foreclosure of one of the parcels
through exercise of the power of sale, the trustor may within 30
days of the sale challenge the selling price of that parcel as be-
ing below its fair market value. The complaint shall set forth:
(1) the balance due on the note secured by the mortgage or
deed of trust at the time of sale;
(2) the sale price of the parcel;
(3) the alleged fair market value of the parcel on the date
of sale; and
(4) the date of such sale.
Before rendering a judgment, the court shall find the fair
market value of the parcel sold at the time of sale, taking into
account the intrinsic value of the property at the time of the
sale. The court may render judgment partially releasing or com-
pletely releasing the remaining parcels as security for the bal-
ance due upon finding that the fair market value of the parcel
sold equaled or exceeded the amount at such sale.
If the trustee's Notice of Sale indicates an intent to sell
more than one parcel in a single nonjudicial sale, the trustor
may bring an action to restrain the sale until an appraisal of
each parcel is made. The court, if necessary to protect the trus-
tor's interest in each parcel, may order that the parcels be sold
separately at 30-day intervals, thus allowing the debtor the op-
portunity to challenge each sale as specified above.
b. Analysis of Proposed Section 580a(1)
Proposed section 580a(1) would revitalize the present section
580a.1 ' The significance of section 580a(1) is that following a non-
judicial sale of one parcel of multiple security, the debtor could bar
or partially bar the creditor's sale of the remaining security by put-
ting in issue the fair market value of the parcel sold.
This interpretation of 580a was espoused by the plaintiffs in
Hatch v. Security First National Bank11 7 and was rejected by the
135. In order to be consistent with the established statutory scheme, the proposed stat-
utes have retained their present section numbers.
136. See supra note 3 for a summary of the text of present section 580(a).
137. 19 Cal. 2d 254, 120 P.2d 869 (1942). See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
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court. The Hatch court noted that section 580a, as presently drafted,
applies only when the creditor is seeking a deficiency judgment after
exhausting all security by exercise of the power of sale. As discussed
in section II part A above, section 580a is obsolete due to the subse-
quent enactment of section 580d which prohibits any deficiency judg-
ment after a nonjudicial sale.'88 Proposed section 580a(1) would ap-
ply in all cases where the creditor is selling additional security, not
only where the creditor is seeking a deficiency judgment following a
nonjudicial sale. An example will best illustrate this point.
Assume a typical multiple security situation in which one obli-
gation for $60,000 is secured by deeds of trust on three parcels.' 9
Each parcel is worth $20,000 at the time the note and deeds of trust
are signed. The debtor defaults in payment on the note which has an
outstanding balance of $40,000. The creditor may either give notice
of the sale of one of the parcels, or may give notices indicating the
sales of all three of the parcels. For purposes of this example, as-
sume the former situation occurs. (The latter will be addressed sub-
sequently.) The creditor sells one of the parcels for $25,000 at a
nonjudicial sale on August 1, 1985. The debtor has 30 days to chal-
lenge the selling price as being below fair market value. The debtor
alleges that the fair market value is $40,000, and the court should
release the two remaining parcels as security. The court will deter-
mine the actual fair market value, which is defined as the intrinsic
value of the property at the time of sale.'" Depending on the court's
finding, the court may release or partially release the remaining
security.
If the court finds the actual fair market value is $40,000, the
court will order the creditor to reconvey the deed of trust encumber-
ing the remaining parcels. On the other hand, should the court find
the property sold has a fair market value of $30,000, there would be
a remaining balance due on the note of $10,000. The creditor could
then hold a second sale of parcel number two. If that parcel is sold
for more than $10,000, the debtor is entitled to the excess, plus he
retains the third parcel as the note is satisfied by the sale of secur-
138. But see Walter E. Heller Western, Inc. v. Bloxham, 176 Cal. App. 3d 266, 221
Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985); Bank of Hemet v. United States, 643 F.2d 661 (9th Cir. 1981). See
supra note 44.
139. The example would also apply to a situation where there is one obligation secured
by one deed of trust covering three parcels.
140. Rainer Mortgage v. Silverwood Ltd., 163 Cal. App. 3d 359, 209 Cal. Rptr. 294
(1985).
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ity. 14 1 Should the sale bring less than $10,000, the procedure starts
over again with the debtor having 30 days to challenge the selling
price as being below fair market value.
While this procedure may appear cumbersome on its face, the
advantages outweigh the disadvantages. Obviously, the most signifi-
cant advantage is that parcels which are sold first will more likely be
sold at their fair market value. The beneficiary's opening credit bid
should more accurately reflect the property's value, in order to avoid
the certainty of future challenge by the trustor. In the past, benefi-
ciaries had a definite incentive to underbid if more than one parcel
secured an obligation. The foreclosing beneficiary knew it might be
the high bidder at the first sale, even though its bid was below fair
market value. The foreclosing beneficiary also knew that it could still
reach the remaining parcels to satisfy its debt in spite of its underbid
on the first parcel. Even if it were not the high bidder, the benefi-
ciary would receive the proceeds from the first sale and be able to
foreclose on the additional parcels if a balance were still owed.
Under the proposed legislation, bidding would be more competitive,
and debtors would receive a price for their property that more accu-
rately reflects intrinsic value.
1 42
Admittedly, creditors could circumvent the statute by dividing
the $60,000 debt into three entirely separate $20,000 notes, each se-
cured by one of the parcels.14'8 However, a debtor in this instance
would then have the option of defaulting on just one of the notes,
while maintaining payments on the other two. If the notes have
cross-acceleration clauses or similar interlocking language, the debts
would be treated as one obligation secured by multiple security. 44
The creditor also may attempt to circumvent the intent of the
statute by holding nearly simultaneous14'5 nonjudicial sales of all the
parcels which were security for the single obligation. Therefore, the
legislation permits the debtor to bring an action asking the court to
141. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 727 (West 1980).
142. Another reality should also be mentioned. Financially hard-pressed debtors will
have a dificult time raising the funds to hire an attorney to bring the lawsuit to challenge the
value of the property sold. This is the problem with much consumer-oriented legislation, and
the author has no ready solution to it.
143. This is similar to the Roseleaf situation. Roseleaf, 59 Cal. 2d at 35, 378 P.2d at
97, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 873. See supra text accompanying notes 56-67.
144. A cross-acceleration clause would provide that a default on one note was a default
on the others. See R. BERNHARDT, supra note 10, § 2.59, at 62-63; Union Bank v. Wendland,
54 Cal. App. 3d at 393, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 549.
145. For example, the creditor could schedule the sales of the parcels one after the other
on the same day.
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restrain the sale of all the parcels until an appraisal of each is ob-
tained. The debtor would have to allege he or she believed the fair
market value of one or more of the parcels was sufficient to cover the
balance due and that it is therefore unnecessary for the creditor to
sell all. The court could then order a piecemeal foreclosure with each
sale held at 30-day intervals. This would only be feasible if the num-
ber of parcels securing the debt was small. Of course, these would be
"nonjudicial" foreclosures, 14" and the debtor's action would, in no
way, undermine the creditor's "one form of action" specified in sec-
tion 726.147
Instead of ordering piecemeal foreclosure, the court could make
a finding as to the fair market value of each parcel and then order
the creditor to sell only as many as are needed to pay off the amount
due. Under the proposed legislation, the court would be free to make
an independent determination of fair market value. Therefore, the
determination of that fair market value prior to sale would no longer
be inconsistent with the legislative scheme. The procedure of having
the court determine fair market value prior to sale is essential where
numerous parcels are involved.
Accordingly, the elements of the complaint are essentially the
same elements that are currently required in section 580a."' The
court must know the balance due on the note secured by the deed of
trust at the time of sale. The date of the sale must be disclosed in
order to ensure that the debtor brought the action within 30 days of
the sale. Pursuant to proposed section 580a(3), the action should be
calendared as a priority matter so as not to unduly delay the credi-
tor's other remedies. 49
The importance of proposed section 580a(1) is that it will allow
the debtor to challenge the selling price of one parcel of multiple
security as being below the fair market value, in order to release or
partially release the remaining security. This remedy is especially
favorable to the debtor during periods of high property value in-
crease. The proposed section 580a(1) will finally provide the debtor
146. Once a judicial foreclosure is held, no other foreclosures are possible because of
section 726. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 726 (West 1980). See supra notes 15-17 & 24.
147. The debtor would be bringing an action to determine fair market value; section
726's "one form of action" refers to the creditor's duty to exhaust the security before obtaining
a personal judgment against the debtor.
148. In the complaint, the debtor shall set forth: first, the balance due on the note se-
cured by the deed of trust; second, the sale price of the parcel; third, the alleged fair market
value thereof at the date of sale; and fourth, the sale date.
149. For example, selling the remaining parcels is another creditor remedy.
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the actual relief envisioned by the 1933 enactment of 580a.' 50
2. Code of Civil Procedure Section 580a(2)
a. Proposed Text of Section 580a(2)
GUARANTOR'S RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE THE
SALE
Whenever a creditor brings an action to collect the balance due
from the guarantor on a note secured by a deed of trust or mort-
gage on real property which has been sold pursuant to a power
of sale, or through a judicial foreclosure sale, the guarantor
shall have the right to present evidence as to the fair market
value of the property sold as of the date of sale. The court shall
render a money judgment against such guarantor for the
amount by which the indebtedness with interest and costs of sale
and of action exceeds the fair market value of the property as of
the date of sale. In determining fair market value, the court
shall take into account the intrinsic value of the property at the
time of the sale. No action shall lie against a guarantor where a
nonpurchase-money note secured by a deed of trust or mortgage
on real property has been sold through exercise of the power of
sale.
b. Analysis of Proposed Section 580a(2)
Before analyzing the purpose of proposed section 580a(2),
which gives a guarantor 5 ' the right to challenge the price obtained
upon foreclosure, an understanding of the present rather complex
situation involving guarantors is necessary. The discussion will first
focus on the purchase-money situation and then on the nonpurchase-
money situation.
A creditor who holds a purchase-money note and deed of trust
can never obtain a deficiency judgment against the principal
debtor,152 regardless of the type of foreclosure chosen. A guarantor,
however, may be held liable for the difference between the sale price
and the balance due on the purchase-money note, because such a
150. See supra section II part A.
151. A guarantor is a person who promises to answer for the debt of another. A guaran-
tor will be held liable should the person primarily responsible for the debt default. CAL. Civ.
CODE § 2787 (West 1974).
152. CAL. CIv. PRoc. CODE § 580b (West Supp. 1986). See supra note 4 for text of
section 580b. See also infra note 162.
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judgment is not defined as a deficiency. 5 The difficulty arises when
the guarantor seeks indemnification from the principal debtor; the
debtor's purchase-money protection shields her from the guarantor's
action.'" The guarantor is thus solely responsible for the balance
due. The character of the note limits the guarantor's remedy 55 and
is not affected by the type of foreclosure the creditor selects.
However, in the nonpurchase-money situation, a guarantor may
be substantially affected by the creditor's choice of type of foreclo-
sure."6 Union Bank v. Gradsky"'5 illustrates this point precisely.
Union Bank nonjudicially foreclosed on its security, then sought the
difference between the sale price and the balance due from the guar-
antor. The guarantor's demurrer was sustained by the trial court
and the action dismissed. In affirming the decision, the court of ap-
peal reasoned that the creditor's selection of nonjudicial foreclosure
substantially impaired the creditor's remedies against the debtor, and
that the creditor was therefore estopped from asserting its rights
against the guarantor. 58 The substantial impairment resulted be-
cause section 580d bars all deficiency judgments after nonjudicial
foreclosure, whether sought directly by the creditor or by way of in-
demnification by the guarantor. Of course, if the creditor chose judi-
cial foreclosure and obtained a judgment against the guarantor for
the balance due, the guarantor could have recovered from the
debtor.'5 9
Presently, a foreclosing creditor who can sue a guarantor for the
unpaid balance on the note has little incentive to sell the property at
the highest possible price. The creditor may purposely enter a low
bid, obtain title to the property, then sue the guarantor for the bal-
ance. Therefore, the guarantor, in order to protect himself, must bid
at least the balance due on the note at the sale. If this amount is
substantial, the guarantor may be in difficulty, as he must bid in
153. See Freedland v. Greco, 45 Cal. 2d 462, 289 P.2d 463 (1955), and Hatch v. Secur-
ity First Nat'l Bank, 19 Cal. 2d 254, 120 P.2d 869 (1942), where the courts noted that a
guaranty is merely additional security for the obligor's debt.
154. Bauman v. Castle, 15 Cal. App. 3d 990, 93 Cal. Rptr. 565 (1971); Gottschalk v.
Draper Cos., 23 Cal. App. 3d 828, 100 Cal. Rptr. 434 (1972).
155. A guarantor is not protected by the anti-deficiency statutes. Everts v. Matteson, 21
Cal. 2d 437, 132 P.2d 476 (1942). See also Heckes v. Sapp, 229 Cal. App. 2d 549, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 485 (1964).
156. Union Bank v. Gradsky, 265 Cal. App. 2d 40, 7 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1968).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 45-47, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 68-69. See also Krueger v. Bank of America, 145
Cal. App. 3d 204, 193 Cal. Rptr. 322 (1983).
159. The guarantor is treated as a surety. CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 2787, 2810 (West 1974);
CAL. Csv. Paoc. CODE § 1050 (West 1980).
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cash. "
The proposed section 580a(2) codifies the result in Union Bank
v. Gradsky"' and addresses the problems encountered by the guar-
antor in the judicial or nonjudicial foreclosure of a purchase-money
deed of trust, and in the judicial foreclosure of a nonpurchase-money
deed of trust."' In the purchase-money situation, where the guaran-
tor has no right to seek redress from the debtor, it is imperative to
give the guarantor the right to raise the fair market value of the
property as a defense to the creditor's action for the balance due.
This right should extend to the judicial foreclosure of a nonpur-
chase-money deed of trust, even though the guarantor may eventu-
ally obtain the amount owed from the debtor. The following exam-
ple illustrates how section 580a(2) might be applied.
In order for the debtor to qualify for a $50,000 purchase money
loan she must find someone to guarantee her note. Her parents agree
to act as guarantors. The debtor immediately defaults on the obliga-
tion, and the creditor nonjudicially forecloses and sells the property
for $40,000 leaving a balance due of $10,000. Civil Code section
580d prohibits the creditor from seeking a $10,000 deficiency judg-
ment against the debtor because of the nonjudicial sale. Had there
been a judicial foreclosure, section 580b would bar a deficiency.
However, the guarantors' separate obligation, which is independent
of the primary debt, gives the creditor a cause of action against them.
If the guarantors can prove at trial that the fair market value of the
property was greater than the $40,000 obtained, the judgment
against them should be reduced accordingly. This would be the re-
sult under proposed section 580a(2). If the fair market value of the
property had been received at the sale, the guarantors' liability
would be substantially reduced or perhaps completely expunged.
Several policy considerations favor adoption of this section. The
creditor's opening bid may more closely reflect the property's fair
market value because he would no longer be certain of recovering the
unpaid balance from the guarantor. Also, it should prevent creditors
160. See CAl.. CIv. CODE § 2924h (West Supp. 1986). The cash of course may be
obtained through a loan.
161. 265 Cal. App. 2d 40, 71 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1968). See supra notes 156-58 and accom-
panying text.
162. If the property is sold judicially, the debtor presently has the right to raise the fair
market value as a defense to a deficiency judgment. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 726 (West
1980). This right has not been extended to guarantors. Professor Bernhardt is of the opinion
that the guarantor probably has a fair value defense as well, since this would be consistent
with the Gradsky rationale and Civil Code section 2809. R. BERNHARDT, supra note 10, §
4.47, at 179-80.
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who underbid from acquiring the property and a judgment against
the guarantor as well, thereby obtaining a double recovery. The
guarantor would no longer be compelled to bid at the foreclosure
sale, since his liability is measured by the property's fair market
value and not automatically by the price obtained at the sale.
3. Code of Civil Procedure Section 580a(3)
a. Proposed Text of Section 580a(3)
PRECEDENCE
In all proceedings brought pursuant to the provisions of this
section, all courts wherein such actions are or may hereafter be
pending, shall give such actions precedence over all other civil
actions therein, except actions to which special precedence is
given by law, in the matter of the setting the same for hearing
or trial, and in hearing the same, to the end that all such actions
shall be quickly heard and determined.
b. Analysis of Proposed Section 580a(3)
Thorough statutory drafting requires inclusion of section
580a(3) in order to ensure the practical effectiveness of the new fair
value provisions in sections 580a(1) and 580a(2). Without giving
such proceedings priority, delay would undermine this trustors' and
guarantors' defense and render the statutory scheme a weak deter-
rent to undervalued bids at foreclosure sales.
B. A Commercial I Residential Dichotomy for Section 580b
Since the enactment of the anti-deficiency legislation in the
1930's, the California courts have been applying section 580b to a
variety of factual situations. This task was made considerably more
difficult in 1963, when the California Supreme Court in Roseleaf
articulated what it believed were the two purposes behind that sec-
tion. An examination of the cases decided subsequent to Roseleaf
reveals that the purposes espoused therein do not withstand scrutiny.
The purported purposes resist every attempt at clear formulation
and tend inexorably to give rise to inconsistent holdings that provoke
litigation. One major trend has gained acceptance, however, and that
is residential purchasers should be protected from deficiency
judgments.
Therefore, section 580b has been redrafted to reflect this trend.
The statute, as rewritten, would prohibit deficiencies against a pur-
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chaser of an owner-occupied, one-to-four unit residential dwelling.
On the other hand, vendors and third party lenders would be per-
mitted to obtain deficiencies if their notes were secured by commer-
cial property. Also, section 580b(2) of the rewritten statute would
codify dictum in Brown that the nature of a loan is determined at its
inception."' Finally, section 580b(3) resolves the Spangler situation
by precluding a deficiency when a buyer purchases property and
then borrows money for the construction of a residence.
The text and analysis of the proposed 580b revisions follow.
1. Code of Civil Procedure Section 580b(1)
a. Proposed Text of Section 580b(I)
RESIDENTIAL PURCHASERS PROTECTED FROM
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT
No deficiency judgment shall lie after any sale of real
property which was security for payment of the balance of (1)
the purchase price of a one-to-four unit, owner-occupied resi-
dence or (2) a loan for the construction of a one-to-four unit
owner-occupied residence.
This section shall apply to both vendors and third-party
lenders of monies for the purchase of real property.
As used in this section, "owner-occupied" means a one-to-
four unit dwelling which will be owned and occupied by a sig-
natory to the mortgage or deed of trust secured by such dwelling
(1) within 90 days of the execution of the mortgage or deed of
trust in the case of an existing dwelling, or (2) if the dwelling is
being constructed, within 90 days after the house is substan-
tially complete, but not later than 90 days after the first of the
following occurs:
1. The date of the final inspection by the applicable public
agency.
2. The date of recordation of a valid notice of completion.
In all other situations, both vendors and third-party lenders
are entitled to a deficiency judgment after judicial foreclosure.
b. Analysis of Proposed Section 580b(1)
The California Legislature and the courts have indicated a de-
sire to protect the residential home purchaser from deficiency judg-
ments.164 Proposed section 580b(1) simply articulates this purpose
163. 41 Cal. 2d 193, 159 P.2d 425 (1953).
164. See supra section 11 part B and section III.
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and, in the process, defines the parameters of the protection.
The statute, as proposed, prohibits deficiencies if the security
for the debt is a "one-to-four unit, owner-occupied residential dwell-
ing." A definition of "owner-occupied" is essential in order to guard
against potential abuses of the section and yet the definition must be
flexible enough to accommodate the realities of modern living.
Therefore, the proposed definition requires only one of the signato-
ries to the mortgage or deed of trust to occupy the dwelling which is
security for the note. This not only makes the section consistent with
Civil Code sections 2954 and 2954.4, which deal with impound ac-
counts and late charges,"' but also takes into account that married
couples or unmarried couples living together may separate and, dur-
ing the separation, one party may retain use of the home.' Also,
this section recognizes the frequent division of property upon dissolu-
tion and permits each spouse to retain his or her interest in the prop-
erty (usually as a tenant-in-common), while only one occupies the
house. 1 7
In addition, some home buyers, because of inadequate credit,
must obtain co-signers on the note and deed of trust to obtain financ-
ing. Most of the co-signers have no intention of occupying the prem-
ises. Therefore, only one of the signatories should be required to oc-
cupy the house.
The second part of the owner-occupied definition requires this
one signatory to occupy the dwelling within 90 days of the execution
of the mortgage or deed of trust. Again, this is consistent with Civil
Code sections 2954 and 2954.4."8 If the house is being constructed,
165. See supra notes 112-15, 121 and accompanying text.
166. Civil Code section 2924.6 states that a due-on-sale clause cannot be exercised when
there is a transfer of title due to dissolution. The proposed legislation which requires only one
signatory to reside in the premises is consistent with the current trend as illustrated in Civil
Code section 2924.6.
167. The person occupying the residence should pay rent to the non-occupying co-ten-
ant. In In re Marriage of Boseman, 31 Cal. App. 3d 372, 107 Cal. Rptr. 232 (1973), the court
allowed the wife to retain possession of the family residence until the youngest child reached
majority. The property was to be sold at that time, and the proceeds divided. The court re-
manded to the trial court for a determination of exactly how the proceeds would be divided.
No mention of rent was made.
168. See supra notes 113, 121 and accompanying text.
"Owner-occupancy" is also a widely used requirement for mortgage loan qualifications.
FHA regulations require owner-occupancy if the maximum loan guarantee of 95% of the
purchase price is sought. There is no owner-occupancy requirement for a loan guarantee of up
to 85% of the maximum. Mortgage Credit Analysis Handbook, Sec. 3, U.S. DEPT. OF Hous-
ING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, Handbook 4155.1 MORTGAGE CREDIT (as amended Dec.
1977).
VA regulations require the veteran to certify that he or she will personally occupy the
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the owner has 90 days to occupy after it is substantially com-
pleted, 69 but no more than 90 days after the final inspection or the
notice of completion is recorded.
The difficulty lies in the possible abuse of the section. As pres-
ently proposed, an individual could move into the premises within
the 90 days, then vacate a week or a month later and use the prop-
erty as a rental. The purpose of protecting those purchasing homes
for their personal use would be defeated.
There are two responses to the foregoing problem. The first is a
practical one: few individuals are willing to incur the expense of and
undertake the problems encountered in actually moving into a home,
unless they intend to remain there for a significant period. Second,
the intent of the debtor at the time the agreement is signed must
control. Admittedly, intent is a subjective criterion and is difficult to
prove, but these difficulties are far from unknown to real property
law."' Objective facts will be examined. For example, did the debt-
ors actually furnish the dwelling and move in for some period of
time? Was this their only address during this period? Was the post
office notified of the change of address? Were utilities and telephone
service transferred into the purchaser's name? These and other fac-
tors can be used to determine the debtor's intent.
If one of the signatories does occupy the premises for a short
period of time, and if, upon default and subsequent foreclosure, the
creditor desires to obtain a deficiency judgment, there should be no
bar to litigating the intent issue in determining the creditor's right to
that deficiency. There is a chance that default might not occur for
years after the debtors vacate, and proof of intent by either party
property as his or her home:
[Tihe words "personally occupy the property as his or her home" mean that the
veteran as of the date of his or her certification actually lives in the property
personally as his or her residence or actually intends upon completion of the
loan and acquisition of the mobile home to move into the home personally
within a reasonable time and to utilize the home as his or her residence.
38 C.F.R. § 36.4206(b) (1984).
169. The term "substantial completion" is also used in section 337.15 as the beginning
of the ten year period within which a person must sue a real estate developer for damages
arising from latent defects.
170. For example, Professor Hetland states:
Any real property transaction intended by the parties to secure an obligation
and not otherwise classifiable is a mortgage. Moreover, parol evidence is admis-
sible to show the intent of the parties, i.e., to show that a transaction appearing
to be something else actually was intended as security for an obligation. (cita-
tions omitted).
J. HETLAND, supra note 10, § 9.4, at 185.
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would be extremely difficult. 71 However, since most people who ob-
tain loans to purchase a personal residence do so in good faith, it
seems unnecessary to address this issue.'12 In the author's opinion
the proposed statute, because of its simplicity, and because it does
leave open the possibility of litigating intent, best accomplishes the
Legislature's purpose of protecting the homeowner.
Section 580b(t) explicitly states that neither vendors nor third-
party lenders may obtain a deficiency judgment if the note is secured
by a residential dwelling. This is simply a codification of present
law. 1' The section further codifies the result obtained in Prunty v.
Bank of America 7 4 and extends purchase-money protection to loans
obtained for the construction of a residence.
However, present law is changed to the extent that, under the
proposed statute, vendors, as well as third-party lenders, may obtain
a deficiency in all other cases. The present section 580b bars vendors
from deficiencies, even if the note is secured by commercial prop-
erty. ' This prohibition serves no valid purpose and has been criti-
cized repeatedly. As discussed previously, several exceptions have
been judicially created.1' The proposed language eliminates the en-
171. The present section 580b, amended in 1963, bars lenders of purchase-money se-
cured by a dwelling for not more than four families from obtaining a deficiency where the
purchaser occupies entirely or in part. The author has found no reported cases in which the
owner-occupancy or residency issues have been litigated. Thus, owner occupancy under the
proposed legislation should not be a major issue.
172. Alternatives to cover situations where the purchaser was attempting to circumvent
potential personal liability were considered and rejected. For example, the statutes could give
the creditor the right to bring a declaratory relief action to determine whether the debtors have
purchase-money protection as soon as the premises are vacated in order to insure that the facts
surrounding the intent issue are fresh. The legislation could be drafted to give purchase-money
protection only to those purchasers who occupied the premises for a certain period of time. But
how would the time period be calculated? Would it begin at the time the note and deed of trust
are signed, or upon actual occupancy? Is actual occupancy measured from the time the occu-
pants first spend the night? Would the period of occupancy have to take place consecutively, or
could the occupants leave the premises for a period of several weeks or months, and then
return, tacking the subsequent period onto the initial period? If the right to protection from a
deficiency had not "vested" before default occurred, the question might arise whether the debt-
ors, although occupying the premises at the time, would be protected. Drafting a statute which
takes such details into account is possible but not necessary.
173. See supra note 4 for text of section 580b.
174. 37 Cal. App. 3d 430, 112 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1974). See supra text accompanying
notes 97-99.
175. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 580b.
176. In the recent case of Shepherd v. Robinson, 128 Cal. App. 3d 615, 180 Cal. Rptr.
342 (1981), a vendor who participated in the refinancing and second sale of the commercial
property was denied a deficiency judgment under the provisions of Civil Procedure Code sec-
tion 580b. When the holder of the senior note nonjudicially foreclosed, the vendor's second
deed of trust was extinguished. The court held that the seller served as a "necessary party" in
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tire problem and extends to vendors rights identical to those of third-
party lenders.
2. Code of Civil Procedure Section 580b(2)
a. Proposed Text of Section 580b(2)
ASSUMPTION OF PURCHASE-MONEY LOAN
The nature of a loan secured by a deed of trust or mortgage is
determined at its inception. If the original purchaser was pro-
tected from a deficiency judgment under section (1) above, the
subsequent grantees who assume that loan are likewise
protected.
b. Analysis of Proposed Section 580b(2)
It has frequently been held that the nature of a loan is deter-
mined at its inception. 1  Proposed section 580b(2) simply codifies
this rule. If a loan is originally defined as purchase-money under
section 580b(1) and is assumed, it retains purchase-money protec-
tion.17 8 Conversely, a nonpurchase-money loan remains such even if
assumed by someone who could have qualified for purchase-money
protection. The primary benefit of such a rule is certainty; neither
the lender nor subsequent assuming borrower need be concerned
with reclassification of the loan during its life.
Under the Garn-St. Germaine Act 17 9 which was enacted on Oc-
tober 15, 1982, all due-on-sale clauses in loans secured by mortgage
the refinancing of the property, and retained his status of seller because of this. The Shepherd
decision, however, has been criticized. One commentator explains that "the court's reasoning is
tenuous and [the author] recommends caution in relying on it." R. BERNHARDT, supra note
10, § 4.32, at 36.
Under the proposed legislation, the vendor who carries back a second deed of trust on
commercial property is allowed a deficiency judgment. This legislation would eliminate deci-
sions such as Shepherd which do not meet the purported end of protecting the residential
homeowner.
177. This was central to the Brown holding. Dicta in several cases support this. Stock-
ton Say. & Loan Bank v. Massanet, 18 Cal. 2d 200, 114 P.2d 592 (1941); Jackson v. Taylor,
272 Cal. App. 2d 1, 76 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1969); Paramount Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Barber, 263
Cal. App. 2d 166, 69 Cal. Rptr. 390 (1968).
178. In recent years, due to rising interest rates, buyers frequently wanted to assume the
seller's old loan instead of financing the balance due on the purchase price with a new loan at
a higher interest rate. As rates decrease, buyers will borrow new funds to pay off the seller's
original higher interest rate loan.
179. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3 (West Supp. 1986). The regulations pertaining to the Act are
codified in 12 C.F.R. §§ 590, 591 (1985).
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or deeds of trust, regardless of date of origination, are enforceable. 80
Lenders thus have final authority to decide whether to allow a loan
to be assumed. The lender's decision may well rest in part on
whether the assuming grantee would have purchase-money protec-
tion if he or she obtained a new loan. The central factor in the
lender's decision, however, will be the interest rate on the note to be
assumed relative to current market rates.
There is no reason to allow the creditor to obtain a deficiency if
a loan, which was originally purchase-money, is assumed. Since the
lender had no recourse against the original borrower, to permit the
lender to sue the assuming grantee, places the lender in a better posi-
tion than it was in originally. Had the lender desired to be able to
obtain a deficiency against the new grantee, it could have exercised
its due-on-sale clause.
By maintaining the character of a purchase-money loan
throughout the life of the loan, regardless of subsequent assumptions,
the lender's rights are not defeated in any way, but a potential wind-
fall to the lender is averted. From the loan's inception, the lender
had no expectation of obtaining personal liability on the debt, and an
assumption agreement should not change that. The only real benefit
of having a new owner agree to assume the debt is that it helps
ensure the lender will not exercise its due-on-sale clause. While an
assumption agreement also generally releases the original borrower
from any liability as a signatory on the note, in the purchase-money
context there is no personal liability. Therefore, such a release is
unnecessary."8'
Under the proposed statute, the buyer who assumes a nonpur-
chase-money loan will be subject to personal liability, just as the
original borrower was. If the residential buyer desired purchase-
money protection, he or she has only to take out a new loan rather
than assume the old loan.
To illustrate the nonpurchase-money situation, assume a person
wanted to buy a residence as investment property. The buyer bor-
rowed part of the purchase price from a lender other than the seller
and secured the note by a deed of trust on property purchased. The
buyer has personal liability, since the note is not purchase-money
under section 580b. If he or she sells the property to someone who
assumes the note, the subsequent owner likewise has personal liabil-
180. The Garn Act window period closed on October 15, 1985. 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-
3(c)(1) (West 1980 and Supp. 1985).
181. A release may be important if the seller is attempting to obtain a new loan.
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ity. Even if the new owner is occupying the property as his or her
personal residence, the personal liability on the original note contin-
ues. It is the subsequent owner's option to take out a new purchase-
money loan to protect against personal liability. Perhaps the interest
rate on the nonpurchase-money loan is attractive enough to offset the
danger inherent in personal liability. In any event, the lender once
again should not have its original rights affected by the mere fact of
assumption.
The proposed legislation codifies the case law which has devel-
oped through the years. The rule is simple and predictable: the char-
acter of the loan, once ascertained, never changes.
3. Code of Civil Procedure Section 580b(3)
a. Proposed Text of Section 580b(3)
SUBORDINATION AGREEMENTS
No deficiency judgment shall lie after any sale of real property
which was security for a loan used for payment of the purchase
price of land and which was in fact subordinate to a construc-
tion loan for a one-to-four unit, owner-occupied residential
dwelling as defined in section (1).
b. Analysis of Proposed Section 580b(3)
Individuals who desire to build their own homes frequently
must finance the purchase of the lot and then subordinate this loan
to one for construction of the residence. Either the vendor or an in-
dependent lender may hold the subordinated note. In either case,
under proposed section 580b(3), no deficiency judgment could be ob-
tained if the purchaser defaults and the subordinated lender is sold
out.
This is a logical extension of the protection to be given to the
residential purchaser. However, a specific provision is necessary in
order to avoid any possibility of the arguments in Spangler v.
Memel1" being applied.
As discussed in section II part B subpart 3, Spangler involved a
vendor who agreed to subordinate the balance of the purchase price
on her lot to a construction loan for a commercial building. In per-
mitting the sold-out junior vendor to sue on her note, the California
Supreme Court reasoned that the seller was in no position to predict
182. See supra note 73.
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the fair market value of the completed structure. Thus, the seller
could not overvalue the property and section 580b's purpose of dis-
couraging overvaluation would not be served by prohibiting a
deficiency.
The same analysis could apply where the buyer was construct-
ing a residence instead of an office building. Here, too, the subordi-
nated seller has no way of being certain that the value of the com-
pleted structure will be sufficient security for both the construction
loan and his subordinated note. However, given the basic premise
that the legislative policy is to protect residential purchasers, this
policy should prevail in any situation where a person desires to own
or construct a personal residence. Any lender who subordinates to a
construction loan for a residence as defined in proposed section
580b(1) should be in the same position as the vendor who takes back
a second to secure the purchase price of a residence; no deficiency
should be permitted. This is guaranteed under proposed section
580b(3).
C. Clarifying the "One-Action" Rule of Section 726
The need to improve the precision and clarity of section 726 in
order to effectuate the Legislature's plain intent is exemplified in
Bank of America v. Daily,S' where, for lack of an explicit definition
of "action" in the 726 context, the court imposed a "double sanc-
tion" on the creditor. Similarly, the statute lacks both an express
statement of the remedies available to debtors under section 726 and
the policy underlying the rule. The proposed amendments would
cure these defects in the statute.
1. Code of Civil Procedure Section 726
a. Proposed Text of Section 726
DEFINITION OF ACTION
[The following definition of "action" would be added to section 726
(a)]:
As used in this section, the term "action" means " an ordinary
proceeding in a court of justice by which one party prosecutes
another of the declaration, enforcement, or protection of a right,
the redress or prevention of a wrong, or the punishment of a
183. 152 Cal. App. 3d 767, 199 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1984). See supra text accompanying
notes 104-08.
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public offense." (This definition is taken from Code of Civil
Procedure section 22.)
b. Analysis of Proposed Definition of "Action"
The first suggested revision would define "action" as "an ordi-
nary proceeding in a court of justice .. ."0" The purpose of this
addition is simply to incorporate the self-evident proposition that sec-
tion 22 applies to section 726. This is necessary because of the lan-
guage in Bank of America v. Daily1 6' where the court held that a
bank's setoff from a trustor's checking account, a procedure devoid of
court involvement, was an action for the purposes of section 726.186
The result of this ruling was that the bank was not allowed to either
request a judicial foreclosure of the property or ask for a personal
judgment against the debtor,16 7 thus resulting in a "double sanction."
2. Policy of Section 726
a. Proposed Policy of Section 726
[A new subsection would be added to section 726 as follows:]
The legislature declares that it is the express policy of the state
to require a creditor to look to the real property security first
before reaching a debtor's other assets. This section shall be lib-
erally construed to effectuate this purpose.
b. Analysis of the Proposed Policy of Section 726
The court in Daily could have prohibited the bank from fore-
closing after the setoff by examining the policy behind section 726
and holding that the policy of requiring the creditor to foreclose first
was violated. Thus, the proposed amendment would expressly incor-
porate this policy statement into the statute. If a creditor were then
to devise some new method of reaching a debtor's unpledged assets
prior to foreclosure, a court could impose a sanction without bla-
tantly distorting the meaning of the word "action" in the section.
184. California Civil Procedure Code section 22 defines "action" in exactly the same
language as that suggested here. CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 22 (West 1985). A reference in
section 726 to section 22 would be sufficient.
185. 152 Cal. App. 3d 767, 199 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1984).
186. Id. at 771, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 559.
187. Id. at 772-73, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 559-60.
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3. Debtor's Remedies Under Section 726
a. Proposed Addition to Section 726
[The following section would be added to section 726(a):]
The creditor or trustee at the creditor's direction shall sell all
the property which is security for a debt before seeking a defi-
ciency judgment pursuant to subsection (b). If a creditor does
not do so, a debtor may compel the creditor to foreclose by
pleading and proving that the debt was secured by real prop-
erty. If the debtor does not compel the creditor to foreclose on
all the security in the creditor's one action, the creditor may
obtain a judgment against the debtor for the balance due but
may not foreclose on the security at a later date. The security
shall be declared free of the mortgage or deed of trust at the
debtor's request.
b. Analysis of Proposed Section 726's Debtor's Remedies
The last proposed addition to the statute would clarify the sanc-
tion a court should impose if the creditor fails to foreclose on all the
security first. As mentioned, the Daily court held that the creditor
could neither reach the security nor obtain a personal judgment
against the debtor. 8 This doubly benefits the debtor, as he or she
now owns the property free of the lien and does not have to repay
the money which was received when the loan was taken out. The
proposed language would remedy this unfair situation by stating that
the creditor who violated section 726 by not foreclosing on all the
security first could proceed to obtain a personal judgment against the
debtor but could not reach the security.'6
As presently written, section 726 does not specify the debtor's
remedy should the section be violated. By incorporating subsections
specifying the remedy and stating the policy of the statute, courts
will be able to better evaluate whether the policy has been violated
and then would know what sanction to impose. The amendments are
necessary in order to nullify the erroneous interpretations given to
the section over the years.19
188. Id. For a discussion of why the double sanction should not be imposed, see Rowan
& Mertens, supra note 102, at 73.
189. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. In addition, it should be noted that if a
creditor were allowed to foreclose after a setoff as in Daily, the fair value provisions of section
726 would be circumvented. See Rowan & Mertens, supra note 102, at 77.
190. The erroneous interpretations have arisen largely because courts have either mis-
understood early holdings interpreting the statute or have relied on commentators who appar-
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V. CONCLUSION
In view of the legislative trend of extending residential home
purchasers protection not available to commercial property owners,
the anti-deficiency statutes are obsolete and in need of major revi-
sions. Therefore the author has redrafted the statutes in order to ac-
curately reflect the legislative desire to protect homeowners.
Section 580a has long been of no practical value. In its place,
the author proposes fair value provisions designed to provide both
property owners who give multiple security for a debt and guaran-
tors, certain rights which they do not clearly possess under the pre-
sent statutes.
As rewritten, section 580b would embody the commercial/resi-
dential purchaser distinction which the Legislature appears to have
adopted. Thus, the courts would no longer be burdened with the
Roseleaf purposes; the new statute's explicit standards would be ap-
plied consistently and with confidence. The revised section 580b
would remove the gray areas under the present law by assuring anti-
deficiency protection for both a grantee who assumes a purchase-
money loan, and for a buyer who purchases land and then borrows
money for construction of a residence.
In addition to the substantial changes to sections 580a and
580b, the author recommends clarifying the "one-action" rule in sec-
tion 726 so as to eliminate uncertainty that has led to questionable
judicial decisions under the present statute.
The proposed legislation, if adopted, would not only provide
clear guidelines for the courts but it would also reflect the growing
concern for residential purchasers which has become apparent in re-
cent years.
ently did not have specific situations in mind. For example, Daily relied on McKean v. Ger-
man-American Say. Bank, 118 Cal. 334, 50 P. 656 (1897) in finding that the setoff was an
"action." A careful reading of McKean will show that it did not hold that a setoff was an
action. Rowan & Mertens, supra note 102, at 75-76.
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